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ABSTRACT
I explored the influence of stereotypes on performance in cognitive tasks as a function of
individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) in a multi-part study. First, I
established that low and high WMC persons maintain equivalent knowledge of common racial
stereotypes. Next, I tested whether stereotype-based responses in cognitive tasks that require
controlled processing are influenced by individual differences in WMC. Given that stereotypical
associations are automatic and cognitively efficient, I predicted that without sufficient resources
to suppress these associations, persons with low relative to high WMC will be more susceptible
to the influence of stereotype-consistent errors on tasks which have been demonstrated to induce
performance differences in low and high WMC persons (Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Engaging
WMC is not required in all cognitive tasks; thus, low and high WMC persons were not expected
to perform differently on tasks that rely on more automatic processes.

Results provided general support for predictions as persons with more inherently limited
cognitive resources committed a higher number of stereotype-consistent errors when performing
a maintenance task and accurately recalled fewer stereotype-consistent words when performing a
retrieval task. However, persons completing inhibition and familiarity tasks, which are
methodologically similar to the maintenance and retrieval tasks but involve less controlled
cognitive processes, performed similarly regardless of WMC.
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1
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Knowledge of common stereotypes is ubiquitous and affects everyday actions and reasoning.
Persons, regardless of prejudice, have demonstrated equivalent awareness of racial stereotypes
(Devine, 1989; Stewart, Weeks, & Lupfer, 2003). Stereotype activation is automatic
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002; Stewart, Weeks, &
Lupfer, 2003). Strong stereotypical associations are capable of yielding unintentional evaluation
which can influence even deliberative decision making (Oliver, 1999; Oliver & Fonash, 2002;
Jones & Kaplan, 2003). Making unbiased decisions that are not influenced by stereotypes
requires sufficient working memory capacity (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Thus, it
seems that the cognitions of persons with limited cognitive resources (i.e., working memory
capacity; WMC) may be more susceptible to the influence of stereotypes. Moreover, greater
WMC should be protective against stereotypical bias in decision making. Surprisingly though,
extant empirical findings have yet to link individual WMC with stereotypically biased
evaluations on cognitive tasks.
A framework put forth by Unsworth & Engle (2007) suggests that specific cognitive
tasks (i.e., those requiring active maintenance of information, or retrieval into memory) highlight
individual differences in WMC as individuals with a low, compared to high, WMC commit more
task errors Thus, if WMC ever impacts the influence of stereotypes on decision making, the
effect is most likely to emerge in maintenance and retrieval tasks under similar methodological
conditions as those already used to establish performance differences between high and low
WMC persons.
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In the present study, it was my aim to investigate whether individual differences in
working memory differentially affect one’s reliance on stereotype use during specific cognitive
tasks. I posited that persons with more inherently limited cognitive resources would commit a
higher number of stereotype-consistent errors when performing maintenance and retrieval tasks.
However, not all cognitive tasks induce performance differences between low and high WMC
persons (Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Thus, persons completing inhibition and familiarity tasks
that are methodologically similar to the maintenance and retrieval tasks but involve different
cognitive processes are expected to perform similarly regardless of WMC. In summation, it was
my intent to examine the gap in the literature linking WMC to the undue influence of
stereotypes. It was my belief that this link has yet to be established due to the nature of the
cognitive tasks put forth in experimental protocols (e.g., inhibition tasks). Thus, I proposed a
five-part investigation wherein I attempted to 1) establish whether low and high WMC persons
maintain similar knowledge of common racial stereotypes, 2-3) test the prediction that WMC
affects the influence of stereotype use on maintenance tasks (2) but not inhibition tasks (3), and
4-5) test my prediction that WMC affects the influence of stereotype use on retrieval (4) but not
familiarity tasks (5).
To build and support my thesis, I will briefly review the evolution of working memory
and working memory capacity; discuss research demonstrating performance differences as a
function of individual capacity; qualify when and how stereotypes are expected to affect decision
making; and finally, specify the hypotheses and methods used in the current investigation.
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1.2 Working Memory (WM)
The theoretical construct, “working memory,” was proposed by Baddeley and Hitch,
1974 to account for problems that Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) influential Modal Model of
memory failed to explain. The Modal Model of memory proposed three stages of memory, or
memory subsystems: Sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory. These
systems were thought to differ in capacity and duration, as well as other features, such as the
main modality for encoding (e.g., visual, auditory, or semantic "codes"). According to this
model, sensory memory holds a vast amount of raw sensory information for up to 10 or 15
seconds (Sperling, 1960). Short-term memory (STM) lasts for 20-30 seconds, is extremely
limited (Miller, 1956; Cohen REFS), and can support semantic, as well as visual or phonological
representations (REFS). Long-term memory (LTM) is virtually unlimited (e.g., new words or
facts can be added without limit), includes associations within and across modalities, and has a
duration of anywhere from a few minutes to 50 or more years. Importantly, the Modal Model
proposes that these three memory processes are strictly sequential: information must be
processed in short-term memory in order to be encoded in long-term memory.
Two key findings presented difficulties for the Modal Model. First, some individuals with
severe cognitive impairments, such as patient K.F., show intact LTM (i.e., normal encoding and
retrieval of information in LTM) in the absence of fully functioning STM (Shallice &
Warrington, 1970). Thus, it appears that a fully intact STM is not necessary for encoding of
information in LTM. Although this observation is not inconsistent with the Modal Model, neither
is it predicted by the model. Therefore, either the Modal Model has inadequate definitions of
STM or LTM (or both), or it is missing a key construct. Second, studies of dual task performance
have shown that, under some circumstances, people can perform two tasks at once, without
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major performance decrements on either task. For example, Baddeley and Hitch (1974)
presented participants a sequence of four single-digit numbers and asked them to keep them in
memory while reading a passage. The fact that subjects could comprehend the reading and
successfully recall the numbers suggested that memory was capable of both the storage and
complex manipulation of information. These results led Baddelely to propose the name working
memory for short-term processes replacing the previous name of short-term memory. Baddeley
defined working memory as a limited capacity system, “that provides temporary storage and
manipulation of the information necessary for such complex tasks as language comprehension,
learning, and reasoning” (Baddeley, 1992, p. 556).
In the Baddeley model, working memory comprises four components: central executive,
phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and (in later versions of Baddeley’s model; Baddeley,
2000b) the episodic buffer. The central executive pulls and integrates information across the
subsystems; the phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and episodic buffer. The
phonological loop holds and processes verbal and auditory information while the visuospatial
sketchpad holds and processes visual and spatial information. Rehearsal in the phonological loop
prevents loss of information by keeping information active. Finally, the episodic buffer moves
information to and from episodic long-term memory.
There is considerable support for Baddeley’s working memory model. For example,
Baddeley, Lewis, and Vallar, 1984 showed that a list of short words is recalled more accurately
than an equally long list of longer words (word length effect). The word-length effect occurs
because the phonological loop has limited capacity (like STM in the Modal Model) and because
information is actively maintained in the phonological loop through rehearsal and shorter words
can be rehearsed at a faster rate, leading to more robust encoding. Articulatory suppression also
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provides support for this model. Rehearsal of information in the phonological loop engages subvocal or articulatory processing (i.e., inner speech). Therefore, if a person continuously a word or
word-like sequence (e.g., “the, the, the…”) during encoding, memory recall is greatly impaired
(Baddeley, et al., 1984). Moreover, the word list effect disappears under articulatory suppression.
Further, whereas articulatory suppression hinders recall of spoken-word lists, it benefits
performance of nonverbal tasks. Specifically, Brandimonite, Hitch, and Bishop (1992) showed
participants a picture of an object (e.g., piece of candy in a wrapper) and then presented them
with a picture of part of the object (e.g., end of wrapper). Without the pictures present
participants were asked to subtract the second picture from the first and then describe the
resulting picture (i.e., a fish in the current example). Half of the participants repeated la, la, la
(articulatory suppression) during the task. Surprisingly, the participants in the articulatory
suppression group outperformed the other group on the subtraction task. This result occurred
because the articulatory suppression group was forced to encode the object as a picture into the
visuospatial sketchpad instead of as a word (i.e., the object name) into the occupied phonological
loop. Thus, manipulating the picture for the subtraction task was made easier as this group
started with a visual image compared to a verbal code.

1.3 Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and Individual Differences: In the Beginning
All models of working memory have assumed that the capacity was finite.1 Furthermore,
researchers recognized that the amount of available capacity affects subsequent processing.
Originally, however, it was suggested that skill or efficiency was what created or limited

1

See Morrison & Chein, 2011, for a recently developing discussion regarding the effectiveness of capacity
enhancing techniques
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remaining capacity (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). That is, the thesis suggested that the capacity
limits of working memory were fixed across all individuals. Differences in performance were the
result of efficiency within the tested domain. Under this framework, the task of reading would
require less capacity for an efficient, compared to an inefficient, reader leaving additional
capacity for an alternative task. However, the efficient reader may be inefficient at solving
arithmetic problems and thus use more capacity for the latter task leaving less residual capacity.
It was this theory that drove Daneman and Carpenter to create the reading span task (described
below) wherein they found high correlations between reading span and various reading
comprehension measures. Importantly, they did not find a significant correlation between a
simple word span test2 and the comprehension measures. The authors argued that the reading
span measure reflects the amount of working memory capacity remaining after allocating the
required resources (which varied depending on participant efficiency) for the processing task.
Furthermore, they suggested that the resulting span score would vary as a function of the
background processing task. Thus, in order to successfully predict reading comprehension the
span task must include a reading processing task.
Turner and Engle (1989) offered a different explanation for the Daneman and Carpenter
(1980) findings. They suggested that working memory capacity may be affecting reading ability
instead of reading ability affecting the capacity remaining above and beyond the processing task.
Stated differently, all persons may not be working with the same fixed capacity. Instead, a larger
working memory capacity may have allowed readers to process and comprehend the material
while concurrently holding several words in memory, whereas a smaller working memory
2

Simple word span tasks orally present participants with a series of 2-7 single-syllable common nouns that they
must recall in presentation order. List length increases until a participant fails to accurately recall all words for 3 out
of 3 lists. The participant’s word span was considered to be the level wherein they accurately recalled all words for 2
out of 3 lists.
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capacity may have limited both the reader’s comprehension of the material and the number of
words that they could keep in memory. Furthermore, Turner and Engle suggested that the
capacity limit was not domain specific. That is, a large working memory capacity should benefit
the processer regardless of the task being performed. To test this hypothesis the authors collected
four complex span and two simple span measures from participants and then conducted a reading
comprehension test. The complex span measures included: 1) the traditional reading span task
used in the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) study, 2) an alternative reading span task wherein the
to-be-remembered stimuli were digits instead of words, 3) an operation span task that required
participants to solve arithmetic problems while holding words or 4) digits in memory. The
simple span measures required participants to hold increasingly larger lists of words or digits in
memory and recall as many as possible in the order that were presented, these measures are
referred to simply as word or digit span respectively. The idea was that if reading ability affected
the remaining capacity and if capacity is domain specific, as was suggested by Daneman and
Carpenter, then individual reading comprehension should correlate with the two reading span
scores but not with either of the operation span scores. Alternatively, if capacity affects reading
ability and if capacity is not domain specific, then reading comprehension should correlate with
all four complex span scores. The simple span scores were not expected to predict reading
comprehension. Results revealed a significant correlation between reading comprehension and
all four complex span scores. Simple span scores did not correlate with reading comprehension.
Furthermore, the operation word span task reliably predicted reading ability even after the
variance accounted for by reading span was removed. Also, it is worth noting that the four span
tasks correlated significantly with each other (r=.38-.58). Taken together, findings suggest that,
as proposed by Turner and Engle, WMC is not domain-specific and that capacity affects reading
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comprehension instead of reading ability affecting the amount of capacity remaining for
alternative tasks.
In 1992 Just and Carpenter proposed the capacity theory of comprehension. The theory
explained capacity as the maximum amount of activation available in working memory to
support storage and processing as both functions draw from the same pool of resources.
Furthermore, the researchers suggested that capacity constrains performance on cognitive tasks,
and it does so more for some people than for others. The authors offered individual differences in
working memory capacity as the cognitive mechanism underlying results from earlier studies
that had previously been explained by differences in cognitive architecture. Specifically, Ferreira
and Clifton (1986) presented participants with sentences wherein the head noun was either
animate, and therefore could act or be acted upon, or inanimate, and thus, could not be
responsible for acting. Animacy was considered a pragmatic cue. Example sentences include:
“The defendant that was examined by the lawyer shocked the jury,” versus “The evidence that
was examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.” Furthermore, half of the sentences were reduced
such that disambiguating information following the initial noun (i.e., ‘that was’) was removed.
The expanded relative clause was considered a syntactic cue. Utilizing the pragmatic and
syntactic cues concurrently should result in equal comprehension of all sentence-types with the
exception of the reduced/animate sentences. Specifically, the meaning of reduced sentences with
an animate head noun would remain unclear until the entire sentence was read. For example, in
the sentence, “The defendant examined by the lawyer shocked the jury,” it is unclear whether the
defendant was examining or was being examined until the phrase “by the lawyer” is read. The
researchers measured participant eye gaze while the sentences were read. The results revealed
that participant gaze duration was longer for the reduced compared to the unreduced sentences
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but animacy had no effect on eye gaze. The authors suggested that the architecture of the system
is such that syntactic processing is encapsulated (i.e., its activities and outputs are unaffected by
information that exists elsewhere in the system).
Just and Carpenter (1992) rejected the theory regarding encapsulated cognitive
architecture and instead postulated that interaction between processing systems (i.e., pragmatic
and syntactic) requires capacity. Capacity, they theorized, was dependent upon the individual. To
test this idea, the authors repeated Ferreira and Clifton’s (1986) experiment but this time looked
at high compared to low span individuals separately. Replicating previous results, reading times
were faster for the unreduced compared to the reduced sentences. However, the primary finding
of interest was the significant difference in eye gaze duration for high- compared to low-span
participants when reading the inanimate sentences. The high-span individuals spent significantly
less time reading the inanimate compared to the animate sentences whereas animacy had no
effect on gaze duration for low-span individuals. The authors explained this finding as the result
of high-span individuals utilizing the pragmatic cue of animacy. Thus, the authors concluded that
interaction between processes was possible (i.e., processes were not modular and embedded), but
that such interaction required capacity. It is important to note that the described results pertain to
the first pass reading only and that during later readings both high- and low-span individual’s
gaze duration decreased for inanimate compared to animate sentences. This indicates that all
individuals can ultimately make use of the pragmatic cue but only high-span individuals do so on
a first pass reading.
MacDonald, Just and Carpenter (1992) offered another instance wherein individual
differences in capacity explained previously conflicting theories. Specifically, researchers had
been debating how individuals may handle ambiguities when reading text. On one side of the
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argument it was thought that immediately upon encountering an ambiguity the reader chose a
single interpretation (Just and Carpenter, 1987); conversely, others argued that the reader
retained both options in mind until the ambiguity was later resolved in the text (e.g., Kurtzman,
1985). MacDonald and colleagues proposed that both camps were valid but under varying
circumstances. They suggested that all readers activate multiple representations upon
encountering an in-text ambiguity. The representations are weighted based on its frequency,
complexity, and plausibility. Differences emerge between high- and low-span readers as they
continue to read. That is, low-span individuals lack sufficient capacity to process incoming
material while continuing to store multiple interpretations in mind; thus, they drop the less
common interpretation and move forward with a single interpretation. High-span individuals
continue to maintain both interpretations for a significantly longer duration. The authors found
support for their position with what may initially be a counterintuitive result. High-span readers
took longer to read ambiguous compared to unambiguous sentences, particularly at the point
wherein the ambiguity is resolved. The effect of sentence ambiguity was generally unreliable for
low-span readers as they read both sentence types equally fast. The authors explained the
somewhat surprising slowdown in processing for the high-span readers as the cost of storing
multiple interpretations of the ambiguous item. However, the payoff for high-span individuals is
evidenced with tests of comprehension, particularly when the accurate interpretation for the
ambiguous item is the less common interpretation, in these instances high-span individuals
perform well whereas low-span individuals often score at or near chance.
This brief depiction of the evolution of working memory capacity chronicles theories and
research starting from the point at which all individuals were assumed to be operating with the
same three levels of memory (i.e., modal model of memory). Presently the thesis of a finite
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capacity that varies across individuals and predicts task performance and abilities is widely
accepted. Furthermore, there is currently substantial support for controlled attention views of
WMC (Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007). I will now turn to the ways in which
individual working memory capacity is commonly measured and current WMC theories and
research.
1.4 Measuring Span
A variety of tasks have been used to measure individuals working memory capacity
(WMC). In each task the individual is forced to draw on their resources from working memory in
order to process stimuli and simultaneously store information for retrieval at a later point. The
resulting span score reflects how successful the individual is able to negotiate both parts of the
task. Broadly speaking, span tasks measure individuals’ ability to multitask. Some of the more
common span tasks are explained in more detail below.
1.4.1 Reading Span
The reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) requires participants to read a set of
unrelated sentences and hold the last word of each sentence in memory for later recall. Reading
span is defined as the maximum set size for which a participant can accurately recall all of the
final words for at least three of five sets. On average, college students’ reading spans range
between 2 and 5.5 with high span individuals accurately recalling all words in sets of four or
more, medium spans accurately recalling all words of in sets of three to three and a half, and low
span individuals accurately recalling all words in sets less than three.
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1.4.2 Operation Span
The operation span task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) requires participants
to determine the validity of two-operation math sentences (e.g., (4+2)/3=6; true or false). After
each math sentence a to-be-remembered letter is presented. Following a sequence of 3-7 mathletter strings, participants are asked to recall the list of letters in the order that they were shown.
A total of 75 math-letter strings are presented throughout the duration of the task. Operation span
is defined as the number of letters accurately recalled in presentation order.
1.4.3 Symmetry Span
The symmetry span task (Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, Payne, & Engle, 2004)
requires participants to perform a symmetry judgment task. After each judgment a red square is
presented within a 4 x 4 matrix. After 2-5 red squares are shown, participants are asked to recall
the sequence of red square presentations in the order that they appeared by clicking on the
various locations on an empty matrix. A total of 42 symmetry-red block strings are presented
throughout the task. Symmetry span is defined as the number of red blocks accurately recalled in
the order that they were presented.
1.4.4 Complex Span Tasks
In practice, complex span tasks, like those described above, are the accepted method of
assessing WMC. Overall, complex span tasks have shown good reliability and validity (see
Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009). Scores on complex span tasks (or WMC)
have been linked to a variety of phenomenon including early onset Alzheimer’s (Rosen,
Bergeson, Putnam, Harwell, & Sunderland, 2002), susceptibility to life-event stress (Klein &
Boals, 2001), and susceptibility to stereotype threat (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Recently,
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researchers have found that complex span tasks are predictive of multiple aspects of cognition
including recall, processing accuracy, processing time, and fluid intelligence (Unsworth et. al.,
2009). Furthermore, the three components that comprise the complex span task account for 69%
of the variance in fluid intelligence.

1.5 Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and Individual Differences: Theories
Whereas WMC is related to multiple higher order cognitive processes (e.g., reading and
reasoning), working memory is not required for all tasks. Unsworth and Engle (2007) put forth a
framework suggesting that performance differences would emerge between low and high
working memory persons only under certain conditions. Specifically, they stated that a) working
memory is needed in order to override automatic response biases and, b) it fulfills two basic
functions, maintenance and retrieval. First, maintenance, or focused attention, occurs in primary
memory and is required to keep novel information active, particularly when internal or external
distractions are present. Importantly, primary memory is a limited but also flexible capacity.
Thus, depending on the task, primary memory may hold more or less information active at a
given time. For example, research by Cowan (2001) has demonstrated that during a word
memory task where the goal is to retain as many representations as possible, primary memory
holds 4 +/- 1 items. When the task goal changes and requires strong control to overcome
automatic responses with success dependent upon goal maintenance primary memory capacity
can shrink to one representation. Second, because primary memory is limited in capacity,
displaced items must be retrieved from secondary memory which is responsible for the storage of
both task relevant and task irrelevant items. Retrieval of task relevant items is guided by a
discrimination process through the use of cues. Thus, the authors suggest that high working

14
memory persons are better able to 1) maintain representations in primary memory and, 2)
conduct controlled searches in secondary memory.
Evidence supporting the aforementioned framework comes from a variety of research.
Beginning with individual differences due to maintenance, take for example studies using the
antisaccade task. The task requires that participants make a response either toward (prosaccade)
or away from (antisaccade) a flashing cue. The automatic and task-required responses align in
the prosaccade trials, thus, there is no need to override the automatic response or to maintain the
task goal in memory in order to perform well. High and low working memory participants
performed equally well on the prosaccade trials (Kane, Bleckley, Conway & Engle, 2001).
However, in the antisaccade trials, the automatic and task-required responses are misaligned;
therefore, control to override the automatic response tendency and goal maintenance is
imperative. High working memory participants completed the antisaccade trials faster and with
fewer errors than the low working memory participants (Kane et al., 2001).
A second example of a task requiring goal maintenance for quality performance comes
from the Stroop task. The Stroop task consists of color names (e.g., GREEN, RED, BLUE)
presented in colored ink and requires participants to name the ink color. Sometimes the ink color
is congruent with the color name (e.g., GREEN printed in green ink) other times the ink color is
incongruent with the color name (e.g., GREEN printed in red ink). When trials comprise either
all congruent or all incongruent words, goal maintenance is unnecessary because the previous
trial reinforces the goal of the current trial. However, when some trials are congruent and some
incongruent, goal maintenance becomes essential. It is in these intermixed trials that the
Unsworth and Engle (2007) framework predicts that performance for high, compared to low,
WMC persons should diverge. That is precisely what researchers have found. Kane and Engle
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(2003) presented participants with either incongruent-only or intermixed Stroop trials. In the
incongruent-only condition there was a negligible difference in error rate as a function of WMC.
Conversely, in the intermixed condition, low working memory persons made significantly more
reading errors than high working memory persons. Kane and Engle suggested that the result was
due to low WMC persons’ inability to maintain the task goal and instead reverting to the
automatic reading response.
The second part of the Unsworth and Engle (2007) framework suggests that individual
differences should emerge during retrieval. The authors argue that a controlled search into
secondary memory requires the use of contextual cues in order to discriminate between task
relevant and task irrelevant information. These cues are organized into a hierarchy and change at
varying speeds (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2006). Using the example of learning word lists, at the
top of the hierarchy and unlikely to change during the learning period are global cues (e.g., the
learning location). Next, there are cues related to each individual list. Finally, at the bottom of
the hierarchy are rapidly changing cues associated with each individual word. High WMC
persons are said to encode items into secondary memory using cues lower on the hierarchy than
low WMC persons. Support for this thesis comes from research using recall tasks. Specifically,
low WMC, compared to high WMC, persons have a tendency to recall fewer target items and a
greater number of previous list intrusions as the list recall task progresses beyond the first list
(Kane & Engle, 2000). The authors argued that because low WMC persons use contextual cues
higher on the hierarchy, they actually create a noisier search set that includes items from
previously learned lists as well as target items from the present list, thus, hindering their
performance.
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It is interesting that in a variant of the recall task, researchers sometimes instructed
participants to forget previously learned lists. Later, participants were unexpectedly asked to
recall words from the forgotten list. Under these conditions, high WMC persons recalled fewer
words than low WMC persons (Delaney & Sahakyan, 2007). The authors suggested that the
finding was the result of the discrepancy between the context at encoding and retrieval. This
mismatch resulted in high WMC using contextual cues to delimit the search to the point of
excluding the target items. However, as the low WMC persons use less specific contextual cues
to confine their search, they maintained the ‘forgotten’ words in their search sets.
Recognition studies provide additional evidence for individual differences in retrieval
processes. Performance in recognition tasks is the result of two separate mechanisms: familiarity
which is automatic and recollection which requires control (see Yonelinas, 2002). Only the latter
is subject to performance differences as a function of individual WMC. For example, Bunting,
Conway, and Heitz (2004) presented participants with statements linking two concepts (e.g., the
lawyer is in the park). The authors manipulated the number of links that were associated with
each concept. During a recognition test, low and high WMC persons responded equally to
concepts with only a single link, as this response was based on a feeling of familiarity. However,
high WMC persons responded more quickly than low WMC persons to concepts with multiple
links; because a response required a controlled search into secondary memory, high WMC
persons’ relatively limited search criterion led to a speedier response.
In summation, the framework put forth by Unsworth and Engle (2007) asserts that
individual differences in WMC emerge when control is required in order to 1) override automatic
response biases on tasks that require goal maintenance in primary memory, or 2) conduct a
delimited controlled search into secondary memory.
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1.6 Diverging Theories
Other theories have been offered as explanations for many of the WMC results.
Specifically, some researchers suggest that inhibition alone, or the ability to stop an automatic
response is the key mechanism underlying a variety of cognitive abilities including WMC
(Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001). According to this framework, it is the high, relative to low,
WMC persons’ superior ability to inhibit automatic responses that creates individual differences.
Alternatively still, others suppose a Binding theory to explain individual differences in WMC
(Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Süß, & Wittmann, 2007). The Binding theory suggests that it is
the strength of the stimulus-response (S-R) relationship that creates the response differences
between high and low WMC individuals, with stronger S-R bindings in high, than low, WMC
persons.
Redick, Calvo, Gay, and Engle (2011) conducted a series of go/no-go experiments in
order to test these diverse theories. Experimental stimuli included the presentation of various
consonant letters. The first experiment included two trial blocks. In the first block, participants
were required to respond go to the presentation of the letter X and provide no response (i.e., nogo) to all other letter presentations. Block 1 was composed of 80% go-trials. In the second block
the instructions were reversed such that participants were to respond go to the presentations of
any non-X letter and not respond to the letter X. According to the inhibition theory of WMC, low
WMC persons should have a more difficult time withholding (i.e., responding with no response)
on the no-go trials than high WMC persons, and this difference as a function of WMC should
occur in both blocks of the experiment. The Binding theory of WMC predicts that the greatest
differences between high and low WMC individuals should occur in the second block as high
WMC persons should be better able to update their S-R relationship. Finally, the maintenance
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and retrieval framework does not suggest a difference in the performance of high and low
working memory persons as the task requires only that participants maintain a single and
consistent (within block) rule, therefore primary memory is not significantly taxed. The results
revealed a main effect of trial-type such that participants made fewer errors on the go- than no-go
trials. The main effect of block was also reliable as performance decreased from the first to the
second block. However, there was no effect of WMC or any significant interactions.
Next, the experimenters modified the task slightly. They changed the task instructions to
require a go-response to the letters W or M but only when the identity of the target letter had
changed from that of the previous target. Thus, a go-response to the letter W was only accurate if
the pervious target was the letter M. A target letter with the same identity as the previous target
letter was considered a lure in the present study. This minor manipulation should change
participants’ strategy for a successful performance. Specifically, whereas the first experiment
required minimal maintenance, participants must have continually updated the task goal and
actively maintained it over time in order to respond accurately in the second experiment.
Therefore, the maintenance and retrieval theory predicted significant performance differences
between high and low WMC individuals in the modified go/no-go task, particularly in response
to trial lures. The results supported these predictions. High and low WMC persons responded
with equal accuracy to distractor trials (i.e., non M or W letters, always requiring a no-go
response). However, low WMC persons made significantly more errors on the target (i.e., M or
W targets requiring a go response) and lure trials (i.e., M or W targets requiring a no-go
response). In additional analyses, the authors looked at low compared to high WMC persons’
accuracy to lure trials as a function of time between the current lure and the previous target.
Stated differently, some lures occurred immediately after a target whereas other lures occurred
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with 1, 2 or 3 distractor items between the lure and the previous target. If it is the case that low
WMC individuals have a more difficult time maintaining the task goal over time than high WMC
individuals then accuracy to lure trials should decrease as the number of intervening distractors
increase for low WMC persons. This is exactly what the authors found. Low and high WMC
persons performed equally well on lure trials occurring immediately after a target trial, thus, the
maintenance requirement was relatively minimal. Conversely, low WMC persons’ performance
declined steadily as the number of intervening distractors (i.e., time) increased, whereas high
WMC persons maintained a consistent level of performance regardless of the time delay since
the previous target. This final analyses depicting a performance difference for high, compared to
low, WMC individuals as a function of the task maintenance requirement provides strong
support for the maintenance and retrieval theory of individual differences in WMC and is
difficult for the other theories (i.e., Inhibition and Binding) to explain.

1.7 Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and Individual Differences: Decision Making
Kahneman (2003) explained the distinctions between intuition and reasoning. He
suggested that intuition is fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and emotional. Conversely,
reasoning is slow, controlled, effortful, rule-governed, flexible, and neutral. Thus, cognitive
resources are required in order to allow for reasoning, which is more logical and less likely to be
influenced by irrelevant circumstances. Researchers have linked individual differences in
working memory capacity to differences in decision making. Specifically, high WMC persons
tend to make more consistent judgments across scenarios than low WMC persons.
For example, Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008) had participants read moral dilemmas and
judge the moral appropriateness of killing one person in order to save others. The dilemmas
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included scenarios wherein the death of another was: 1) necessary to save a) oneself and others
or b) only others; 2) a) inevitable regardless of the subject’s actions or b) could be avoided; and
3) a) a direct (i.e., pushing the target) or b) indirect (i.e., push a button that caused the target to
fall) result of the subject’s actions. The runaway trolley is an example of a typical moral
dilemma. In this dilemma there is a trolley barreling down the tracks towards five unaware
workers. If the trolley continues on its current path it is certain to kill all of the workers. In the
direct-action version of the dilemma the participant must physically throw a heavy man from the
train platform onto the tracks in order to stop the trolley and save the workers. In the indirectaction version of the dilemma the participant must push a button that will divert the trolley down
a different track where a single workman will be hit and killed but the lives of five workmen will
be spared. In each version of the dilemma, the subject’s actions lead to the death of one workman
which prevents the deaths of five workmen; thus, the outcomes are the same. The directness of
the physical intervening action should not logically affect the moral appropriateness of the
killing. Importantly, moral appropriateness judgments were not time limited.
Nevertheless, overall, killing to save oneself and others, killing when death was
inevitable, and indirect killing were each determined to be more morally appropriate than killing
to save only others, killing when death was avoidable and direct killing. Of primary interest for
the present discussion was the role of individual WMC on judgments of moral appropriateness.
When the death of another was avoidable all persons judged it to be equally morally appropriate,
however, when the death was inevitable persons with high, compared to low, WMC found it to
more morally appropriate. Additionally, persons with high WMC were found to make more
consistent judgments of moral appropriateness than persons with low WMC when the dilemmas
required direct action. The authors suggest that these findings were the result of high WMC
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persons’ increased deliberative judgments particularly in the cases requiring direct action in
order to kill when the death was inevitable. Supporting this argument, Greene and colleagues
(Greene, Nystorm, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) proposed that moral dilemmas requiring
direct action evoke an automatic emotional response against causing harm. However, the biased
(and irrational) response can be overridden by cognitive control.
In a similar line of research, authors investigated participants’ tendency to engage in
counterfactual thinking as a function of WMC (Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & Beike, 2003).
Counterfactual thinking often occurs after a negative event and involves the generation of
alternative event endings. This tendency is spontaneous (Kahneman, 1995) and thus, avoiding it
should require effortful suppression. In order to test this prediction the authors first assessed
WMC via the operation span task. Next, they presented participants with 8 short stories wherein
someone is the victim of an unforeseen accident. Half of the stories manipulate the victims’
actions such that a counterfactual alternative is made salient. For example, in one control story, a
worker leaves the job after a typical workday (i.e., at 5:30) and is broadsided on the way home.
Alternatively, in the counterfactual version of the story, the worker becomes restless on the job
and decides to leave early to see a movie (i.e., 4:30) and is broadsided on the way to the theatre.
The time that the victim leaves work should have no bearing on the degree to which s/he is
determined to be at-fault for the incident or the amount of compensation that s/he is awarded.
However, the counterfactual version of the story makes an alternative ending to the event
particularly easy to create (i.e., if only s/he had been more responsible and stayed at work until
5:30, then this would not have happened) and thus, the victim appears responsible for the
outcome.
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During the experimental procedure, participants were presented with an external load.
Specifically, participants were shown 6 bisylliabic nonwords that they were to study for later
recall. Participants either read case facts or made juror judgments regarding victim
compensation, and victim guilt while keeping the nonwords in memory. Results revealed that
low WMC persons awarded significantly less compensation to victims and attributed a greater
amount of blame to the victim in the counterfactual story condition than in the control
conditions. Conversely, high WMC persons were unaffected by the story condition when
deciding victim blame and compensation amount.
Each of the aforementioned studies demonstrates the importance of cognitive resources in
making consistent and logical decisions that are not biased by irrelevant details.

1.8 Individual Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and New Directions
As reviewed above, WMC varies across individuals and affects judgments and decision
making on a variety of tasks. Low, compared to high, WMC persons’ cognitive resources are
more completely taxed under certain conditions. In such circumstances irrelevant but
automatically activated task information is more likely to inform low WMC persons’ decision
making (e.g., the emotionality of direct versus indirect killing; the counterfactual actions of the
victim). What has not yet been tested (with the exception of Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012;
see study overview below), is whether high WMC is protective against undue stereotype
influence. That is the question under investigation in the present study. Specifically, using
Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) maintenance and retrieval theory of individual differences in
WMC, in the current study I will test whether low, relative, to high WMC persons’ differ in their
tendency to make stereotype-consistent errors on maintenance and retrieval tasks. As stereotypes
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are automatically activated (see examples and elaboration below) and require resources to
suppress, I posit that low WMC persons will be more susceptible to the influence of stereotypes
than their high WMC counterparts.

1.9 Stereotypes are Ubiquitous and Natural
Person perception models suggest that the first step in perceiving someone or something
includes categorization (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Newberg, 1990). Whereas categorization is
beneficial in that it is cognitively economic; the process is not without negative consequences.
Categories and category memberships allow for prejudgment as “the category saturates all that
it contains with the same ideational and emotional flavor” (Allport, 1954; pg 21). Categorization
is thus both a necessary and sufficient prerequisite to stereotyping. Fiske (2004) defines
stereotyping as applying to an individual one’s cognitive expectancies and associations about the
group. Common societal stereotypes are transmitted efficiently through the social and cultural
environment with children as young as three demonstrating stereotype awareness (Cramer &
Steinwert, 1998). Stereotypes are learned, or over learned, to the point of being automatically
activated (i.e., unintentionally, involuntarily, effortlessly, and outside awareness; see examples
below), thus, it should be of no surprise that stereotypes often have undue effect on judgment,
memory, and decision making.

1.10

Stereotypes are Automatically Activated

Although everyone may not endorse a common societal stereotype, these ingrained
associations are activated automatically. For example, Blair and Banaji (1996, Experiment 2)
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presented participants with stereotypic gender traits followed immediately by a male or female
name. Participants were to identify the gender of the name. Findings revealed that participants
more quickly identified male than female names after the presentation of stereotypical male traits
and more quickly identified female than male names after the presentation of stereotypical
female traits. As the time between the trait and name presentation (250 ms) was insufficient to
allow for controlled processing, the authors argued that this result was due to automatic
stereotype activation. Specifically, the gendered trait served as a prime. Thus, when the
trait/name pair was stereotype-consistent response time was fast. Conversely, when the gendered
trait was presented prior to a stereotype-inconsistent gendered name, automatically activated
expectations were violated and response time suffered.
Researchers have found that racial stereotypes were automatically activated for low and
high prejudice persons alike (Stewart, Weeks, & Lupfer, 2003). In this study, participants were
shown head and shoulder photos of Black and White men presented concurrently with three
behavior statements. The behavior statements depicted either stereotypical or non-stereotypical
African American traits (e.g., trait: athletic; behavior statement: often played in pickup
basketball games after school). Immediately following the presentation of the photo/behavior
statements, participants were given a probed recognition memory test. The recognition test
required that participants indicate (yes/no) whether any of four presented words had been
included verbatim in the previous behavior statements. The probe word for the stereotypical
behavior statement was the implied trait. Participants, regardless of individual prejudice, were
more likely to mistakenly say that they remembered seeing the implied trait when the
stereotypical behavior statement was paired with a Black than a White face. These finding
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support the conclusion that, independent of personal convictions, all persons are aware of, and
sometimes influenced by, automatically activated stereotype associations.
Researchers capitalized on automatic stereotype activation in an effort to measure
implicit prejudices. The result was the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998). The IAT presents participants with the category labels ‘pleasant’ and
‘unpleasant’ with one each on the left or right side of the computer screen. Participants are asked
to categorize unambiguous words (e.g., ugly or peace) according to the appropriate label as
quickly as possible. Next, the labels ‘Black’ and ‘White’ are presented. Participants are asked to
categorize ethnic names (e.g., Jamal or Adam) according to the appropriate demographic. After
several trials with the single labels, the two labels from the two categories were presented
concurrently in either consistent (pleasant and White; unpleasant and Black) or inconsistent
(unpleasant and White; pleasant and Black) trials. The reaction times for correct word and name
categorizations were averaged for the consistent and inconsistent trials. A faster average reaction
time for the consistent trials reflects a strong stereotypical association and is often labeled as
reflecting an implicit bias against Black persons.

1.11

The Efficiency of Stereotypes

“As a rule monopolistic categories are easier to form and to hold than are differentiated
categories.” (Allport, 1954)
A clever set of studies conducted by Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994)
demonstrated the cognitive efficiency of stereotypes. In the first experiment, participants
completed two tasks concurrently; they formed an impression of a target using trait descriptors
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while simultaneously monitoring audio prose. The authors manipulated the presentation of the
trait descriptors such that half of the participants saw the targets with a stereotype label (e.g.,
doctor, skinhead) and half did not. The authors reasoned that if the use of stereotypes is energy
efficient, then, forming impressions of targets described with a stereotype label (versus targets
described without a label) should preserve capacity allowing for enhanced performance on the
prose monitoring task. Their hypothesis was supported as participants forming impressions with
the aid of a stereotype label (compared to no label) scored higher on a multiple choice
questionnaire testing memory for the presented prose. In a second experiment, the authors
repeated the study but made one important change; they presented the label subliminally. The
results from study one were replicated. In a final study the authors attempted to quantify the
resources preserved via stereotype use. In this study the second task was changed (previously the
prose monitoring task); participants were now required to monitor for and respond to a beeping
noise. Reaction time was measured. Results revealed that stereotype activation (supra- or
subliminal) lead participants to respond nearly 230ms faster to the monitoring task (supraliminal
stereotype label: 582ms; subliminal stereotype label: 571ms; no stereotype label: 812ms). In
combination, these results provide convincing evidence that stereotype use is cognitively
efficient.
As stereotyping is energy efficient it is often the default when cognitive resources are
limited. One example of stereotypes affecting decision making when controlled processing was
precluded comes from Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby (2002). Researchers presented participants
with a prime consisting of either a Black or a White face, followed by a picture of either a tool or
a weapon and then asked participants to identify the object. Participants primed with the Black
face more accurately identified the weapon and misidentified the tool, a tendency that persisted
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regardless of instructions to avoid using race as a cue. A follow-up study revealed that
participants were immediately aware of their object classification errors and were able to provide
the correct classification when given a second opportunity, but were unable to suppress the
erroneous classification initially (Payne, Shimizu, & Jacoby, 2005). The authors suggested that
the robustness of activated stereotypes make it difficult to suppress rapid response decisions. In a
separate but related study Payne (2005) found a relationship between cognitive control and
stereotype use. Payne used participant scores on weapon identification and word evaluation tasks
to calculate a process dissociation procedure (PDP) in order to discern estimates of automatic
versus controlled components of performance. The author used this measure to explain
individual differences in stereotype-consistent errors and judgments. The results revealed that
participants utilizing relatively more control during tasks made fewer stereotype-consistent errors
and judgments. This finding demonstrates that when greater executive control is engaged
automatic biases decrease.
Stereotype use can be avoided, however, there is a cognitive cost; monitoring stereotypes
requires mental resources. Specifically, Richeson and Shelton (2003) investigated whether an
interracial interaction was cognitively taxing for high- relative to low-prejudice persons. To that
end, researchers presented White participants with an IAT, engaged them in a 2-minute recorded
interview with either a same- or other-race experimenter, and finally assigned a Stroop task for
completion. Participants with an above-average IAT bias score revealed greater Stroop
interference after interacting with the Black than the White interviewer. Participants with a
below-average IAT bias score did not exhibit a difference in Stroop interference as a function of
the interviewer’s race. These results support the conclusion that stereotype monitoring utilizes
working memory capacity limiting the remaining resources available for other tasks.
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Taken together these studies demonstrate that cultural knowledge of stereotypes and
stereotype activation are ubiquitous. Furthermore, the influence of stereotypes in judgments and
decision making is most pronounced when capacity is limited as stereotype use is energy
efficient whereas stereotype avoidance requires cognitive resources.

1.12

Stereotypes Bias Memory and Decision Making

“The possession of stereotypes may interfere with even the simplest rational judgment.”
(Allport, 1954)
Stereotypes can promote event-memory errors. For example, Kleider, Pezdek, Goldinger,
and Kirk (2008), presented participants with a slideshow depicting a homemaker and a
handyman working in a home performing both stereotypical (handyman hammering nails) and
atypical (handyman baking cookies) actions. Two days later, participants were more likely to
misattribute actions to the stereotypical actor as opposed to the atypical actor witnessed
performing the action. The authors suggested that people rely on stereotypes to determine the
source of information when episodic memory is weak.
Stereotypes can also promote face recognition errors. Oliver (1999) showed participants a
30-minute news clip wherein two wanted posters were displayed for 10 seconds each. The
posters depicted Black and White perpetrators of one violent and one nonviolent crime
(counterbalanced). The participants tried to identify the violent criminal among foils both
immediately and again three months later. The accuracy of the immediate identifications was not
affected by the race of the perpetrator. However, over time, participants that originally saw a
White suspect paired with the violent act were increasingly likely erroneously to recall a black
suspect. In a follow-up study, Oliver and Fonash (2002) decreased the time delay between
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witnessing the perpetrator and completing the identification task. Participants read crime briefs
coupled with a photograph of the suspect (both Black and White). After a 20-minute delay,
participants were asked to identify which of 10 photos were featured in the previously read crime
briefs. Of the 10 presented photos only 4 were suspects (6 were filler, 3 Black, and 3 White).
Participants were significantly more likely to misidentify a Black foil than a White foil as
featured in the violent crime stories. The authors found no difference in identifications for the
nonviolent stories.
Stereotypes can bias decision making. Jones and Kaplan (2003) found that when mockjurors were asked to make verdict decisions for perpetrators accused of committing stereotypeconsistent (i.e., Black man committing a blue-collar crime like grand-theft auto or a White man
committing a white-collar crime like embezzlement) versus stereotype-inconsistent crimes
participants rendered more guilty verdicts, gave longer sentences, held the perpetrator more
responsible for the crime, and were more confident in their decisions. The authors theorized that
stereotype-confirming information elicits less of a search for disconfirming facts.
These findings together highlight the point that stereotypes can have a biasing influence
on various cognitive processes. Furthermore, these studies emphasize the importance of available
cognitive resources in combating stereotypical biases. Thus, it seems highly plausible that
individual WMC may well be a predictor of stereotypical influence. However, with the exception
of one study (described below), extant literature has yet to establish such a link.

1.13

Individual Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and Stereotype Use

Kleider and colleagues (2012) presented high and low WMC participants, playing the
role of mock-jurors, with ostensible trial case facts. Each case was shown concurrently with a
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photo of the accused defendant in the crime. Participants were asked to read the case facts and
then render a verdict decision of guilt or innocence and indicate their level of confidence in their
verdict decision (1-7). Decision time was unlimited. The accused defendant was either a Black or
a White man. All cases depicted Black stereotype-consistent crimes (e.g., armed robbery).
Additionally, for half of the cases, participants were required to hold an additional load in
working memory (i.e., six to-be-remembered nonsense words) during the decision making
portion of the task. Finally, individual prejudice level was assessed.
Kleider and colleagues (2012) suggested that while race should not be an influencing
factor in juror-type judgments, knowledge of the Black-man-as-criminal stereotype is ubiquitous
in American culture; thus, avoiding a biased decision requires cognitive resources. They
hypothesized a high level of prejudice would act as an additional load as monitoring biases
requires working memory capacity (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Thus, they posited that low
WMC individuals who were high in prejudice against Black persons would render stereotypeconsistent (i.e., biased against Black defendants) verdict responses but only when cognitively
taxed (i.e., externally loaded). The high WMC persons were not expected to make biased verdict
decisions regardless of individual prejudices or external load manipulations.
The results supported these predictions. Under conditions of high external load,
participants that were high in individual prejudice and low in WMC rendered significantly
harsher judgments to Black compared to White defendants. The high WMC persons, regardless
of individual prejudice level, were able to render similar judgments to the Black and the White
defendants under conditions of external load. When sufficient cognitive resources were available
(i.e., no external load conditions), high prejudice participants rendered equivalent verdicts to
Black and White defendants regardless of individual WMC. These findings support the
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suggestion that high WMC is protective against the ubiquitous influence of stereotype in
deliberative decision making.
1.14

The Current Study

In the current study I attempted to extend the findings of Kleider et al (2012) by testing
whether persons with low relative to high WMC were more likely influenced by stereotypes
when making judgments in maintenance and retrieval tasks. Specifically, Unsworth and Engle’s
(2007) maintenance and retrieval theory of individual differences in WMC stipulated conditions
under which high WMC persons should outperform low WMC persons, including tasks requiring
that 1) goal relevant information be maintained in primary memory, or 2) delimited controlled
searches be conducted into secondary memory. Given that stereotypical associations are
automatic and cognitively efficient, I posited that without sufficient resources to suppress, low
relative to high WMC persons would be more likely to make more stereotype-consistent errors
on maintenance and retrieval tasks. However, as explained above, low and high WMC persons
were not expected to perform differently on other cognitive tasks (Unsworth & Engle, 2007).
Thus, performance and stereotype use were predicted to be similar for low and high WMC
persons completing other decision making tasks that required inhibiting a response and
recognizing stimuli as familiar.
In the present investigation, the influence of stereotypes on cognitive tasks as a function
of individual WMC was explored in a five-part study. First, in a Pilot Experiment I asked
whether all participants (low and high WMC) have equivalent knowledge of common racial
stereotypes. Then, to answer the primary questions of interest, I conducted four experiments. The
first set of experiments involved cognitive tasks using primary memory; one maintenance and
one inhibition task. With a single-task manipulation, I hypothesize that WMC affects
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performance and stereotype influence on maintenance tasks but not inhibition tasks. The second
set of experiments involved the use of secondary memory; one retrieval and one familiarity task.
Again, with a single-task manipulation, I aim to demonstrate that WMC affects performance and
stereotype influence on retrieval tasks but not familiarity tasks. To that end, participants’ WMC
was tested using the operation span task (Unsworth, et al., 2005). Next, participants completed a
cognitive maintenance (Experiment 1A) or inhibition task (Experiment 1B) and retrieval
(Experiment 2A) or familiarity task (Experiment 2B). Finally, individual prejudice was
measured.
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CHAPTER 2:
PILOT EXPERIMENT
2.1 Overview
The aim of the Pilot Experiment was to determine whether low compared to high WMC
persons maintain different knowledge regarding common racial stereotypes. To test this, high
and low WMC participants were presented with a series of person-descriptors (e.g., athletic,
disciplined) wherein they determined whether each descriptor reflected a racial stereotype of
either Black persons, Asian persons, or neither. I predicted that persons with low and high WMC
and low and high levels of individual prejudice would demonstrate high agreement regarding
common racial stereotypes. That is, I suggest that descriptors considered highly reflective of the
Black and/or Asian racial stereotype would be similar for all participants regardless of individual
WMC or prejudices.
Participants completed a total of three tasks in the following order: Operation span task
(Opspan), stereotype agreement task, and individual prejudice survey. The Opspan task required
participants to solve a series of two-step math equations while holding a list of letters in memory.
Next, participants determined whether they thought a series of descriptors accurately reflected a
common societal stereotype by placing each descriptor in a labeled ‘bucket’ (i.e., Black, Asian,
Neither). Finally, the Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS) was administered as a
measure of individual prejudice.

34
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Participants
A total of 119 (110 female)3 undergraduate students, who self-identified as native English
speakers, were recruited from introductory psychology courses at Georgia State University in
exchange for course credit. Participants were at least 18 years of age. No other exclusion
criterion was used. Participants were run in groups of 2 to 8 during experimental sessions.
2.2.2 Materials
2.2.2.1 Operation Span Task Participants first completed the Automated Operation Span Task
(OPSPAN; Unsworth, et al., 2005). In this computer-administered test that assesses WMC, an
equation (e.g., “9/3 + 5 = 8”) is presented and participants are prompted for a true-false response.
Next, a to-be-remembered letter is displayed for 800ms. The equation/letter sequence is repeated
until 2-7 letters have been presented. When prompted, participants are required to recall all
letters, in presentation order, via mouse-click. On-screen feedback displays the total number of
correctly recalled letters for each trial. There are a total of 75 equation/letter trials that vary in set
size. The OPSPAN score is the number of correctly recalled letter sequences across all trials.
Higher scores reflect higher WMC.
2.2.2.2 Stereotype Agreement Task Participants were presented with a series of 100 descriptors
on a computer screen. Included descriptors were expected to be considered common stereotypes
for African American (41) and Asian men (39) as well as neutral (20). Descriptors expected to be
stereotype-consistent were chosen based on pre-pilot questionnaires and previous research
3

Although females were disproportionate represented in the current sample, it is important to note this this sample is
demographically similar to the other samples included in this study.
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(Stewart, Weeks, and Lupfer, 2003; see Table 1 for complete list). Participants were asked to
indicate whether each descriptor reflected an existing racial stereotype for African American
men, Asian men, or neither. Participants indicated their decisions by pressing the labeled key on
the keyboard.
2.2.2.3 Individual Prejudice Survey The Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS), an
established self-report measure of prejudice attitudes towards African Americans, was used to
asses individual prejudice levels. The scale was modified in order to also obtain self-report
measures of prejudice towards Asian Americans. Participants were presented with the phrase ‘I
would be willing to have a White American person as my:’ followed by a sequence of 14 nouns
(e.g., next door neighbor, romantic date, governor, wife or husband). Participants rated the
degree to which they agreed with each statement using a 9 point Likert-type scale. Next,
participants were presented with the phrase ‘I would be willing to have a Black American person
as my:’ followed by the same sequence of 14 nouns. Finally, participants were presented with the
phrase ‘I would be willing to have an Asian American as my:’ again followed by the same
sequence of 14 nouns. Statement presentation and response time was unlimited.
2.2.3 Procedure
Participants signed consent forms and were seated at one of eight individual computer
stations. Participants were informed that the study consists of several tasks and that the specific
directions for each task would be read as the session progressed.
2.2.3.1 Operation Span Task Participants were told that for the first task we were interested in
their ability to do two things at once. Practice trials were presented in order to ensure that
participants were comfortable with the task speed. During the test trials, their job was to solve
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the math equations quickly and accurately while holding the letter lists in memory until
prompted to recall the letters in presentation order. All responses were made via mouse-click.
2.2.3.2 Stereotype Agreement Task Participants were informed that for the next task we were
interested in what people consider to be common racial stereotypes. Specific instructions read as
follows, “The next thing you are going to be doing is reviewing a series of descriptors sometimes
ascribed to specific ethnic groups. Some are commonly known stereotypes and others are not.
Please determine if each descriptor reflects a common social stereotype, and if so, then for what
group. While making these decisions, please keep in mind that we are not asking whether or not
you agree with the implied association but rather, if you agree that is in fact a known stereotype.”
Participants indicated their response by pressing the labeled key on the keyboard. Response time
was unlimited. Once a response was logged, the next descriptor was presented.
2.2.3.3 Individual Prejudice Survey Finally, the Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS)
was administered. Participants were told that they were answering questions regarding their
opinions on various social issues. The true purpose of the measure was concealed until debrief in
an effort to avoid biasing participant responses through the influence of demand characteristics
or social desirability concerns. The session concluded with a brief demographic survey.
Following all tasks, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

2.3 Results
2.3.1 OPSPAN Scores
A tertiary split was used to separate participants into WMC categories, following the
method of Goldinger, et al., (2003). Approximately one-third of the original participants were
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considered to have low WMC (n= 41; WMC scores ranging from 6-24) and one-third were
considered to have high WMC (n= 38; WMC scores ranging from 50-75), the remaining onethird (n= 40) were considered to have average WMC and were not included in relevant
comparisons.
2.3.2 Prejudice Levels
Two prejudice scores were calculated for each participant; one (high, low) for prejudice
towards Black Americans and one (high, low) for prejudice towards Asian Americans. Prejudice
levels were calculated by summing participant responses to each of 14 statements (i.e., 1-9)
separately for the three question-types (White American persons, Black American persons, and
Asian American persons). The response total of the questions pertaining to Black American
persons was subtracted from the response total of the questions pertaining to White American
persons. This calculation was performed separately for each participant. Negative and zero
prejudice scores indicate a bias in favor of Black persons or a neutral attitude and were
considered to reflect low levels of individual prejudice (n= 85) whereas positive prejudice scores
indicate a bias against Black persons and were considered to reflect high levels of individual
prejudice (n= 34). Next, the response total of the questions pertaining to Asian American persons
was subtracted from the response total of the questions pertaining to White American persons.
Again, the calculation was performed separately for each participant. Negative and zero
prejudice scores indicate a bias in favor of Asian persons or a neutral attitude and were
considered to reflect low levels of individual prejudice (n= 46) whereas positive prejudice scores
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indicate a bias against Asian persons and was considered to reflect high levels of individual
prejudice (n= 73). 4
2.3.3 Stereotype Knowledge Survey
I had multiple goals for the current dataset. First, I wanted to identify the list of
descriptors that were considered stereotype-consistent for African American men and Asian
American men as well as those that were considered neutral. To that end, the percentage of
participants identifying a descriptor as a common social stereotype for each group (African
American, Asian, and neither) was calculated. A descriptor was considered to be stereotypeconsistent or neutral if at least 50% of participants identified it as common (or not) to a specific
group. The entire list of presented descriptors is displayed in Table 1, as well as how they were
originally predicted to be identified, and which predictions were supported. Overall, 72% of the
descriptors were identified consistent with expectations; particularly for the descriptors posited
to be common African American (95%) and Asian stereotypes (79%). However, the descriptors
predicted to be neutral were rarely identified as such (20%). Thus, we generated a new set of
descriptors expected to be neutral and tested them on a new set of participants (discussed in
detail below). The complete list of stereotype-consistent descriptors and agreement ratings are
available in Table 2.
My second goal was to identify descriptors that could be used in memory portions of later
experiments. Thus, I had two criteria when considering which descriptors to include. First, the
majority of persons had to agree that the descriptor reflected a common social stereotype, and

4

In all analyses for Experiments 2 and 3, prejudice was controlled for; however, in the current analyses it was a
between-subjects factor in order to ensure that individual prejudice level did not impact knowledge of common
social stereotypes.
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second, given that many of the descriptors were synonyms, I could only have a limited number
of descriptors with overlapping meanings. The final set of descriptors used for the memory tests
are available in Table 3.
My third goal was to test my prediction that high and low WMC persons have similar
knowledge of common racial stereotypes. To that end, I looked at the percentage of high,
compared to low, WMC persons that acknowledged common racial stereotypes. My focus for
these comparisons were the descriptors identified as to-be-used in Experiment 2 as these are the
descriptors we want to ensure persons maintain equivalent stereotypical knowledge for
regardless of WMC. Knowledge was considered to be equivalent across groups so long as at
least 51% of low and high WMC participants identified it as common to the group identified as
consistent (e.g., Football Player and African American). All but three descriptors passed this test
(meticulous: low WMC- 44%, high WMC- 61%; mild: low WMC- 49%, high WMC- 53%;
submissive: low WMC- 49%, high WMC- 58%).
2.3.4 New Neutral Descriptors
As the majority of the original ‘neutral’ descriptors (80%) were not classified as
belonging to the ‘neither’ category as expected, we generated a new list of descriptors/phrases
that we tested for their neutrality. Twenty-three participants (a subset of those included in the
previous rating task) rated 135 words/phrases (100 used in original rating task plus 35 new
neutral words/phrases) using the identical protocol described above. The new neutral list can be
seen in Table 4. Overall, 58% of the new neutral words were not considered to be common racial
stereotypes for either African American men or Asian men and were therefore considered
neutral. Eighteen of the new neutral words were chosen to be included in later memory tasks.
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2.4 Discussion
Overall, these findings suggest that there is generally high agreement regarding common
racial stereotypes among both high and low WMC persons. In the current study, high and low
WMC persons were considered to be in agreement that a stereotype was common to a specific
ethnic group so long as 51% or more of each group agreed. However, it is unknown if and/or
how the differences in degree of agreement may have affected the results of the memory test
(Experiments 3a and 3b). That is, although the majority of all persons, regardless of WMC, were
in agreement with regards to which descriptors were common to African American or Asian
American men, sometimes more low, than high, and sometimes more high, than low, WMC
persons indicated agreement e.g., 76% versus 81%). Although this is worth future study, I
suggest that these differences do not preclude drawing valuable insights form Experiment 3
results.
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CHAPTER 3:
EXPERIMENT 1 (A and B)
3.1 Overview
The goal for Experiment 1 (A and B) was to assess whether low WMC persons make
more stereotype-consistent errors during a cognitive maintenance task than high WMC persons.
To that end, participants completed a modified go/no-go task (Redick, et al., 2011). Specifically,
participants were asked to respond ‘go’ to pictures that follow a rule set and inhibit responses to
pictures outside the rule set. A series of pictures depicting faces (Black, White), objects (tool,
weapon), and shapes (square, circle) were presented sequentially. A rule set determined which
face-type, object-type, and shape-type warranted a go-response. The rule set included either
stereotype-consistent ‘go-targets’ (Black face and weapon) or stereotype-inconsistent ‘gotargets’ (Black face and tool). The shape category is considered to be neutral (neither stereotypeconsistent nor stereotype-inconsistent). The purpose of the shape being included in the ‘go’ rule
set is to serve as a baseline measure for individual maintenance errors. Accuracy and response
time of go/no-go responses were recorded.
In Experiment 1 version A (Maintenance), the identity of an accurate go-stimulus (facetype, object-type, or shape-type) was contingent upon the identity of the previous go-stimulus
(must come from a different ‘go’ category). Thus, withholding a go-response to lures (picture
from the same go-category as the previous go-category) presents a need to override an automatic
response. This automatic-response bias is expected to be further exacerbated by the stereotypeconsistent lures (compared to stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-neutral lures). Therefore, I
suggest that fewer cognitive resources will lead to 1) increased errors (go-response to lures)
overall and, 2) increased errors to stereotype-consistent lures specifically.

42
In Experiment 1 version B (Inhibition), as the task rules change, successful performance
is dependent upon one’s ability to inhibit a response. As performance on inhibition tasks have
not been found to differ as a function of WMC, I expected that low and high WMC persons
would perform equally well in the go/no-go responses. I predicted no performance differences in
number of errors committed or influence of stereotypes on errors made as a function of
individual WMC.

3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
A total of 248 (122; 106 female completed the maintenance task (A) and 126; 97 female
completed the inhibition task (B)) undergraduate students were recruited from introductory
psychology courses at Georgia State University in exchange for course credit. Participants were
at least 18 years of age. No other exclusion criterion was used. Participants were run in groups of
2 to 8 during experimental sessions.
3.2.2 Materials
3.2.2.1 Operation Span Task Participants first completed the Automated Operation Span Task
(OPSPAN; Unsworth, et al., 2005) described above.
3.2.2.2 Maintenance Task (A) The maintenance task used in the present investigation was
modeled after the conditional go/no-go task used by Redick and colleagues (2011) wherein low
WMC persons were found to commit more errors than high WMC persons. Specifically,
individual picture stimuli consisting of faces (Black and White), objects (weapons and tools),
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and shapes (circles and squares) were presented in the center of a computer screen. Participants
were instructed to respond to go-stimuli (those following a given rule set) by using their
dominant hand to press a single button on the keyboard. A rule set established one face-type
(Black or White), one object-type (weapon or tool), and one shape-type (circle or square) that
warranted a go-response. Furthermore, the rule specified that only pictures from a category
different than the category of the previous go-trial require a go-response. All pictures outside the
stated rule set require a no-go response (see Figure 1 for pictorial explanation). Responses to lure
presentations are of primary interest. Lures consisted of any pictures included in the go- rule set
but which require a no-go response. For example, if a participant’s first go-response is to a goobject then their next go-response should be to a go-face or go-shape; however, if the next gotarget presented is a go-object (i.e., a lure), a no-go response is the correct choice. The rule set
included either stereotype-consistent targets (e.g., Black face and weapon) or stereotypeinconsistent targets (e.g., Black face and tool). The stereotype-consistency of the rule set varied
between subjects. All rule sets include a neutral target (e.g., circle). Each picture was shown in
color in the center of a black screen for 450ms, followed by a by a blank screen for 700ms.
Participants had 1150ms to make a response to each picture.
After completing 40 practice trials, participants completed three test blocks, each
consisted of 200 trials. The trials included 40% distractor trials (any pictures not included in the
‘go’ rule set), 40% target trials, and 20% lure trials (10% stereotype-consistent, 10% stereotypeneutral). Each block took approximately 4 minutes to complete.
3.2.2.3 Inhibition Task (B) The inhibition task used in the present investigation was modeled
after the go/no-go task used by Redick and colleagues (2011) wherein low and high WMC
persons were found to commit a similar number of errors. The task was virtually identical to the
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maintenance task with a single modification; a go-response was not contingent upon the category
membership of the previous go-response. The rule set again established one face-type (Black or
White), one object-type (weapon or tool), and one shape-type (circle or square) that warranted a
go-response. All pictures outside the stated rule set required a no-go response. The rule set either
included stereotype-consistent targets (e.g., Black face and weapon) or stereotype-inconsistent
targets (e.g., Black face and tool). The rule set changed half-way through the task such that
persons originally responding ‘go’ to Black faces and weapon objects, next responded ‘go’ to
Black faces and tool objects, and vice versa. The presentation order of the rule set varied
between subjects. All rule sets included a neutral target (e.g., circle). Each picture was shown in
color in the center of a black screen for 450ms, followed by a by a blank screen for 700ms.
Participants had 1150ms to make a response to each picture.
After completing 40 practice trials, participants completed the first 200 trial test block,
next the rule set was changed and participants again completed 40 practice trials and finally the
second 200 trial test block. The trials included 20% distractor trials (any pictures not included in
the ‘go’ rule set), 80% target trials.
3.2.2.4 Individual Prejudice Survey The Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS),
described above, was also used.
3.2.3 Procedure
Participants signed consent forms and were seated at one of eight individual computer
stations. Participants were informed that the present study consists of several tasks and that the
specific directions for each task would be read as the session progressed.
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3.2.3.1 Operation Span Task Participants were told that for the first task we were interested in
their ability to do two things at once. Practice trials were presented in order to ensure that
participants were comfortable with the task speed. During the test trials, their job was to solve
the math equations quickly and accurately while holding the letter lists in memory until
prompted to recall the letters in presentation order. All responses were made via mouse-click.
3.2.3.2 Maintenance Task (A) Participants were informed that the next task was a go/no-go task
wherein they would be presented with a rule set and a series of photos. The rule set was
explained as follows: “the picture series will include photos of Black and White faces, circle and
square shapes, and weapon and tool objects. Your job is to respond ‘go’ only to Black faces,
circle shapes, and weapon (or tool) objects (go-targets will be varied across participants).
Furthermore, you will only respond ‘go’ to a go-target (i.e., Black face, circle shape, weapon
object) that comes from a category (i.e., face, shape, or object) different than the previous gotarget. For example, if you see a circle shape and respond ‘go’ then the next time that you
respond ‘go’ should be to either a Black face or a weapon object but NOT to a circle shape.
Thus, targets that require a ‘go’ response depend on the category of the previous go-target. Do
these instructions make sense? Do you have any questions? ” Participants were instructed to
respond ‘go’ to the photos that follow the rule set by pressing a marked key on the keyboard with
their dominant hand. They were to withhold a response to any photo outside the rule set.
Participants were informed that they were to make their responses as quickly and accurately as
possible. The specific rule set guiding their responses as well as task instructions were reiterated
on the computer screen prior to the start of the task. Practice trials were presented in order to
ensure that participants were comfortable with the task speed. Once all participants completed
the practice block, the experimenter offered anyone that was not comfortable moving onto the
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test trials the opportunity to repeat the practice block before moving forward. Response accuracy
and reaction time was recorded.
3.2.3.3 Inhibition Task (B) Participants were informed that the next task was a go/no-go task
wherein they would be presented with a rule set and a series of photos. The rule set was
explained as follows: “the picture series will include photos of Black and White faces, circle and
square shapes, and weapon and tool objects. Your job is to respond ‘go’ only to Black faces,
circle shapes, and weapon (or tool) objects (go-targets will be varied across participants). Do
these instructions make sense? Do you have any questions? ” Participants were instructed to
respond ‘go’ to the photos that followed the rule set by pressing a marked key on the keyboard
with their dominant hand. They were to withhold a response to any photo outside the rule set.
Participants were informed that they should make their responses as quickly and accurately as
possible. The specific rule set guiding their responses as well as task instructions was reiterated
on the computer screen prior to the start of the task. Practice trials were presented in order to
ensure that participants were comfortable with the task speed. Once all participants confirmed
that they were comfortable with the task, they moved forward with the test trials. Response
accuracy and reaction time was recorded.
3.2.3.4 Individual Prejudice Survey Finally, the Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS)
was administered. Participants were told that they would be answering questions regarding their
opinions on various social issues. The true purpose of the measure was concealed until debrief in
an effort to avoid biasing participant responses through the influence of demand characteristics
or social desirability concerns. The session concluded with a brief demographic survey.
Following all tasks, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 OPSPAN Scores
A tertiary split was used to separate participants into WMC categories, following the procedure
of Goldinger, et al., (2003). Approximately one-third of the original participants were considered
to have low WMC (n = 42 maintenance task, range: 0-32; n = 41 inhibition task, range: 0-33)
and one-third were considered to have high WMC (n = 39 maintenance task, range: 51-75; n =
43 inhibition task; range: 47-75), the remaining one-third (n = 41 maintenance task; n = 42
inhibition task) were considered to have average WMC and were not included in the analyses.
3.3.2 Prejudice Levels
Prejudice levels were calculated by summing participant responses to each of 14 statements (i.e.,
1-9) separately for the two question-types (White American persons and Black American
persons). The response total of the questions pertaining to Black American persons was
subtracted from the response total of the questions pertaining to White American persons. This
calculation was performed separately for each participant. Prejudice score was controlled for in
all analyses.
3.3.3 Maintenance Task (A)
Two 2 Rule Set (stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent) x 2 WMC (high, low) ANCOVAs were
conducted with 1) target hits and, 2) distractor errors as the dependent variables, controlling for
individual prejudice score. The results revealed a significant rule set x WMC interaction on
target hits F(1,76) = 6.65, ηp2 = .08, p = .01, as low WMC persons made more target hits in the
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stereotype-consistent (88%) than –inconsistent (78%) rule condition F(1,39) = 5.36, ηp2 = .12, p
= .03. Additionally, low WMC persons made fewer target hits in the stereotype-inconsistent
condition (78%) than high WMC persons (87%) F(1,39) = 4.5, ηp2 = .10, p = .04; whereas high
WMC persons attained similar hits across conditions (stereotype-consistent: 82%, stereotypeinconsistent: 87%) and hit rate was statistically equivalent within the stereotype-consistent
condition (low WMC: 88%, high WMC: 82%). There were no significant effects or interactions
for error rate to distractors.
Next, the overall 2 Lure-Type (stereotype-related, stereotype-neutral) x 2 Rule Set
(stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent) x 2 WMC (high, low) ANCOVA was conducted,
controlling for individual prejudice score. Error rate to lures were the dependent variable of
interest. There was a main effect of lure-type, with persons committing significantly more errors
to stereotype-related (M = 50%) than –neutral lures (M = 46%), F(1,76) = 10.99, ηp2 = .13, p <
.01. The main effect of WMC was significant F(1,76) = 5.51, ηp2 = .07, p = .02, as low WMC
persons committed more errors (54%) than high WMC persons (42%). Finally, the lure-type x
WMC interaction was also significant F(1,76) = 4.23, ηp2 = .05, p = .04, as low, compared to
high, WMC persons committed a greater number of errors to stereo-related lures (low WMC:
57%, high WMC: 43%) while all persons, regardless of WMC, committed a similar number of
errors to the neutral lures (low WMC: 50%, high WMC: 41%).
Next, I tested my three a-priori predictions. First, low WMC persons should commit more
errors to stereotype-consistent than –inconsistent lures. Results failed to support this prediction
as low WMC persons committed a similar number of errors to stereotype-consistent (M = 61%)
than –inconsistent (M = 54%) lures F(1,39) = 1.03, p = ns. Second, low WMC persons should
commit more errors to stereotype-consistent than neutral lures. Support for this prediction was
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generated as low WMC persons committed more errors to stereotype-consistent (M = 61%) than
neutral (M = 55%) lures F(1,19) = 5.19, ηp2 = .22, p = .03. Finally, low WMC persons should
commit more errors to stereotype-consistent lure than high WMC persons. Supporting this
prediction, low, compared to high, WMC persons committed more errors to stereotype-consistent
lures (low WMC: 61%, high WMC: 40%) F(1,36) = 9.8, ηp2 = .21, p < .01. No other simple
effect comparisons were significant (see Figures 2 and 3 for a pictorial representation of
findings). Together, these results provide strong support for the suggestion that low WMC
persons are more susceptible to making stereotypical errors on maintenance tasks than either
neutral errors or high WMC persons.
3.3.4 Inhibition Task (B)
I expected that low and high WMC persons would perform equally well on both target and
distractor trials regardless of whether the rule set included stereotype-consistent or –inconsistent
targets. To test this prediction, two 2 Picture-Type (stereo-related, neutral) x 2 Rule Set
(stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent)5 x 2 WMC (high, low) ANCOVAs were conducted,
controlling for individual prejudice score. Target hits and distractor errors were the dependent
variables of interest. Picture-Type served as the within-subjects factor while rule set and WMC
were between-subjects factors. When considering target hits, there were no significant main
effects or interactions. Regarding distractor errors, a main effect of picture-type emerged, as
persons were more likely mistakenly to respond ‘go’ to a stereo-related (35%) than a neutral
(27%) picture, F(1,79) = 14.32, ηp2 = .15, p < .01. There were no other significant main effects or
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Only performance on the second set was considered as this is where inhibition was required to overcome the
previously learned and practiced rule.
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interactions.6 Overall, these results support the hypothesis that WMC does not affect
performance differences on inhibition tasks regardless of stereotype-consistency.

3.4 Discussion
Together, the significance of the abovementioned results are twofold. First, they provide
strong support for my suggestion that low WMC persons are more susceptible to stereotypical
errors than high WMC persons when performing maintenance tasks. Second, they support and
extend the maintenance portion of Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) maintenance and retrieval
theory of individual differences in WMC, as WMC was found to influence errors made when
performing maintenance but not inhibition tasks. However, it was surprising that low WMC
persons committed a similar number of errors to stereotype-consistent and –inconsistent lures.
Potentially, the stereotype-consistent compared to the –inconsistent rule set promoted an
increased ‘go’ response leading to a greater number of hits to ‘go’ targets and false alarms to
‘no-go’ lures. That is, maybe the stereotype-consistent targets naturally fit together better than
the stereotype-inconsistent targets causing low WMC persons, who maintain insufficient
resources to override an automatic response, to adopt a more liberal ‘go’ criterion in the
stereotype-consistent condition (Signal Detection C; see Macmillan and Creelman, 2005).
To test this suggestion, hit rate (correctly saying ‘go’ to target items) and false alarm rate
(incorrectly saying ‘go’ to lure items) were calculated, and then analyzed with signal detection
procedures to ascertain accuracy (d’) and bias ( C ) scores. Higher d’ scores indicate better
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The Picture-type x rule set interaction was trending toward significance F(1,79) = 3.45, ηp2 = .04, p = .07 with
persons following stereotype-consistent rules committing 38% errors to stereo-related pictures and 27% errors to
neutral pictures and persons following stereotype-inconsistent rules committing 32% errors to stereo-related pictures
and 27% errors to neutral pictures. There was not a main effect of rule set for either stereo-related or neutral
pictures.

51
sensitivity than lower scores. C scores represent the criterion, or response bias, used to identify a
target. The criterion scores range from conservative/strict (1.0), suggesting a tendency to not say
‘go’ to an item, to liberal/lax (-1.0), suggesting a tendency to say ‘go’ to an item. A 2 Rule Set
(stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent) x 2 WMC (high, low) between-subjects ANCOVA was
conducted with d’ and C as the outcome variables of interest. There was a main effect of WMC
on d’ F(1,76) = 5.94, ηp2 = .07, p = .02, as high WMC persons were better able to distinguish
between hits and false alarms (1.29) than low WMC persons (.91). Consistent with post-hoc
predictions, there was a significant two-way interaction for differences in C, F(1,76) = 4.90, ηp2
= .06, p = .03, such that in the stereotype-consistent rule set low versus high WMC persons
adopted a significantly more liberal ‘go’ criterion (low WMC: -.77, high WMC: -.36).
Additionally, the tendency for low WMC persons to adopt a more liberal decision criterion when
in the stereotype-consistent (M = -.77), versus –inconsistent (M = -.46), rule condition was
trending toward significance (p = .08). Conversely, high WMC persons adopted a similar
decision making criterion regardless of rule set (stereotype-consistent: -.36, stereotypeinconsistent: -.52). Thus, although low WMC persons committed a similar number of errors to
lures regardless of rule set, this result suggests a trend for the stereotype-consistent rule set to
facilitate a ‘go’ response whereas the stereotype-inconsistent rule set inhibited a ‘go’ response.
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CHAPTER 4:
EXPERIMENT 2 (A and B)
4.1 Overview
The goal for Experiment 2 (A and B) was to assess whether low WMC persons make
more stereotype-consistent errors during a memory retrieval task than high WMC persons. To
that end, participants were presented with multiple to-be-remembered word lists. Each word list
consisted of ten phrases describing an ostensible person. The person’s name was at the top of the
list to act as a category label. Two of the names were considered highly representative of African
American male names (e.g., DeShawn Washington) and two of the names were considered
highly representative of Asian male names (e.g., Li Nguyen). The remaining two names were
control names (e.g., David Williams) and not associated with or indicative of a particular race.
The ten phrases included stereotype-consistent descriptors, stereotype-inconsistent descriptors,
and stereotype-neutral descriptors. Phrase type was determined through pilot ratings (see Pilot
Experiment above). Memory for the phrase descriptors was the dependent variable of interest.
Similar to Experiment 1, versions A and B of the experiment were identical with the
exception of a single task manipulation. Following the guidelines outlined in Unsworth and
Engle’s (2007) framework, procedures used in version A were designed to require a delimited
search into short-term memory (i.e., active retrieval), and thus, should bring about performance
differences between low and high WMC persons. Specifically, following each list presentation,
participants were asked to complete a free recall memory test. Conversely, version B required
that participants recognize presented descriptors as ‘old’ and previously presented or ‘new’ and
never before seen. Familiarity promotes successful task completion; thus, low and high WMC
persons were expected to perform equivalently.
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In Experiment 2 version A (Retrieval), accurate retrieval of to-be-remembered items
across multiple lists including both stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent targets required a
controlled search using delimited cues (descriptors only from the most recently presented list),
thus, I posited that less specific search cues (characteristically used by low WMC persons) would
lead to poorer performance on memory tests. Therefore, I expected that when recalling list
phrases, regardless of individual prejudice level, low compared to high WMC persons would
demonstrate a greater number of stereotype-consistent intrusions from previously studied lists
and/or a lesser number of stereotype-inconsistent hits (i.e., accurate recall) from presently
studied lists.
In Experiment 2 version B (Familiarity), successful performance relied on one’s sense of
familiarity. As judging familiarity is an automatic response, and not dependent upon cognitive
resources (Oberauer, 2005), I expected that low and high WMC persons would be equally
reliable in determining whether a presented word was ‘old’ and previously shown or ‘new’ and
never before seen. I predicted no performance differences in number of errors committed or in
the influence of stereotypes on errors made as a function of individual WMC.

4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
A total of 214 (112; 86 female completed the retrieval task (A) and 102; 88 female
completed the familiarity task (B)) undergraduate students, who self-identified as native English
speakers, were recruited from introductory psychology courses at Georgia State University in
exchange for course credit. Participants were least 18 years of age. No other exclusion criterion
was used. Participants were run in groups of 2 to 8 during experimental sessions.
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4.2.2 Materials
4.2.2.1 Operation Span Task Participants first completed the Automated Operation Span Task
(OPSPAN; Unsworth, et al., 2005) described above.
4.2.2.2 Retrieval Task (A) The retrieval task used in the present investigation was modeled after
the task used by Kane and Engle (2000) wherein low WMC persons were found to commit more
recall errors than high WMC persons. The present retrieval task included six word list
presentations. For each list presentation participants were shown 10 phrases/descriptors
describing an ostensible target person. After the list presentation, participants completed a
rehearsal prevention task before being asked to recall and record as many of the descriptors as
possible.
Each list was included 10 descriptors intended to describe an ostensible person (2 Black,
2 Asian, 2 ambiguous). The ethnicity of the person was implied through the name (first name and
surname) which was presented akin to a category label for each word list. The ethnic surnames
were chosen by looking at demographic data online. Surnames that were identified as one of the
200 most popular in America and most common among a specific ethnic group were chosen. For
example, Washington was considered a popular surname and 90% of persons with the surname
Washington self-identified as Black. The first names were taken from online lists detailing ‘most
common names for Black/Asian boys.’ The ambiguous names also included surnames that were
among the 200 most popular in America but no ethnicity claimed the majority of these names.
For example, Williams was considered a popular surname, however, 49% of persons with the
surname Williams self-identified as White, 47% Black, >1% Asian, and >2% Hispanic.
Additionally, the ambiguous first names were considered popular boy names but did not fall on
either the ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ list. Pilot testing was used in order to confirm that the names chosen
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for each of the three ethnicity categories (Black, Asian, ambiguous) were appropriate. Eight
judges determined that DeShawn Washington and Jamal Jackson were Black (88% and 100%
respectively), and Li Nguyen and Yen Tran were Asian (88% and 100% respectively). However,
judges primarily thought that David Williams and John Woods were White (75% and 88%
respectively).
Each list describing a racially-distinguishable target included 10 descriptors; 4
stereotype-consistent, 4 stereotype-inconsistent, and 2 neutral. Lists describing a raciallyambiguous target also included 10 descriptors: 4 stereotype-consistent to African American men,
4 stereotype-consistent to Asian men, and 2 neutral. The descriptor-type was determined based
on pilot testing. All lists were presented on a computer screen with the person’s name at the top
of the screen and the descriptors shown one at a time in the center of the screen. Each descriptor
was presented for 1750ms followed by a 250ms black screen. List presentation was complete
after approximately 20 seconds.
Immediately after each list presentation participants completed a rehearsal prevention
task for 16 seconds. The Trail-Making task (used by Kane and Engle, 2000; created
independently by Ricker and Axelrod, 1994; Baddeley, 1996) presents participants with a letter
and number target (e.g., F-61) and requires that they count up (e.g., G-62, H-63, I-64, etc.) as
quickly and accurately as possible. After 16 seconds, participants were cued to type their ending
results.
Next participants were allotted 30 seconds to retrieve the list words. For the memory test,
participants were cued, after the rehearsal prevention task, to retrieve and list as many descriptors
as possible from only the most recent list presentation. Participants recorded their retrieved word
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lists on a screen that listed only the targets first and last name. At the end of the 30 second
retrieval period, the computer screen changed to indicate the start of the next trial.
After all lists were presented and free recall was been tested, participants completed a
cued recall test. During the cued recall test each of the 60 descriptors listed during the
presentation phase were show individually on the computer screen. With each descriptor,
participants were prompted to indicate, via key-press, which individual the word described. The
names of all six individuals were listed (alphabetically by surname) on the screen concurrently
with each descriptor.
4.2.2.3 Familiarity Task (B) This task was identical to the retrieval task with only a minor
change to the memory test; participant’s recognition memory was tested. Specifically, following
the presentation of a list of descriptors and the rehearsal prevention task, participants were shown
a series of 6 (3 ‘old’ and 3 ‘new’) descriptors individually and asked to identify each as either
‘new’ and never before seen or ‘old’ and previously presented.
4.2.2.4 Individual Prejudice Survey The Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS), an
established self-report measure of prejudice attitudes towards African Americans, was used to
asses individual prejudice levels. We modified the scale in order to also obtain self-report
measures of prejudice towards Asian Americans. Using E-Prime software participants were
presented with the phrase ‘I would be willing to have a White American person as my:’ followed
by a sequence of 14 nouns (e.g., next door neighbor, romantic date, governor, wife or husband).
Participants rated the degree to which they agree with each statement using a 9 point Likert-type
scale. Next, participants were presented with the phrase ‘I would be willing to have a Black
American person as my:’ followed by the same sequence of 14 nouns. Finally, participants were
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presented with the phrase ‘I would be willing to have an Asian American as my:’ again followed
by the same sequence of 14 nouns. Statement presentation and response time was unlimited.
4.2.3 Procedure
Participants signed consent forms and were seated at one of eight individual computer
stations. Participants were informed that the present study consisted of several tasks and that the
specific directions for each task would be read as the session progressed.
4.2.3.1 Operation Span Task For the first task, participants were told we were interested in their
ability to do two things at once. Practice trials were presented in order to ensure that participants
were comfortable with the task speed. During the test trials, their job was to solve the math
equations quickly and accurately while holding the letter lists in memory until prompted to recall
the letters in presentation order. All responses were be made via mouse-click.
4.2.3.2 Retrieval Task (A) Participants were informed that the next task was a multipart memory
task. Participants were presented with a 10-phrase list connected to a target individual. List
presentation took approximately 20 seconds (2 seconds per word). Following each list,
participants completed a rehearsal prevention task (Trail-Making task) for 16 seconds. At the end
of the Trail-Making task, participants were cued to record their ending result. Next the screen
prompted participants to recall the word list with the following statement: You previously saw a
list of words/phrases describing (DeShawn Washington). List as many of those words/phrases as
you can recall on the next screen. You will be given 30 seconds to do this before the screen will
automatically advance. Press the enter key after each word/phrase entry. After 7500ms the
screen automatically advanced to a screen that prompted: (DeShawn Washington)… Participants
were allotted 30 seconds to list as many words as possible after which the computer screen
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changed. Before the next trial began, a break screen was presented that stated: Please press the
spacebar when you are ready to begin the next trial. The process repeated itself until all six word
lists were presented and recalled. With the exception of the first trial, which always lists an
ambiguous target person (and will serve as a baseline level of recall), the presentation order for
the other lists was randomized.
Immediately following the free recall phase (including the presentation and free recall of
six separate lists), participants completed a cued recall task wherein they were asked to indicate
which of the six target persons each of the 60 presented adjectives described. Response time was
unlimited.
4.2.3.3 Familiarity Task (B) Participants were informed that the next task was a multipart
memory task. Participants were presented with a 10-phrase list connected to a target individual.
List presentation took approximately 20 seconds (2 seconds per word). Following each list,
participants completed a rehearsal prevention task (Trail-Making task) for 16 seconds. At the end
of the Trail-Making task, participants were cued to record their ending result. Next, participants
were prompted to identify a series of descriptors as either ‘new’ and never before seen or ‘old’
and previously presented. Responses were made via key press. The process repeated itself until
all six word lists were presented and recognition memory was tested. With the exception of the
first trial, which always lists an ambiguous target person, the presentation order for the other lists
was randomized.
4.2.3.4 Individual Prejudice Survey Finally, the Bogardus (1925) Social Distance Scale (SDS)
was administered. Participants were told that they would be answering questions regarding their
opinions on various social issues. The true purpose of the measure was concealed until debrief in
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an effort to avoid biasing participant responses through the influence of demand characteristics
or social desirability concerns. The session concluded with a brief demographic survey.
Following all tasks, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

4.3 Results
4.3.1 OPSPAN Scores
A tertiary split was used to separate participants into WMC categories (Goldinger, Kleider,
Azuma, and Beike, 2003). Approximately one-third of the original participants were considered
to have low WMC (n = 35 retrieval task, range: 0-33; n = 35 familiarity task, range: 0-32;) and
one-third were considered to have high WMC (n = 42 retrieval task, range: 46-75; n = 31
familiarity task, range: 51-75;), the remaining one-third (n = 35 retrieval task; n = 36 familiarity
task) were considered to have average WMC and were not included in the analyses.
4.3.2 Prejudice Levels
Two prejudice scores were calculated for each participant; one for prejudice towards Black
Americans and one for prejudice towards Asian Americans. Prejudice levels were calculated by
summing participant responses to each of the 14 statements (i.e., 1-9) separately for the three
question-types (White American persons, Black American persons, and Asian American
persons). The response total of the questions pertaining to Black American persons was
subtracted from the response total of the questions pertaining to White American persons. This
calculation was performed separately for each participant. Next, the response total of the
questions pertaining to Asian American persons was subtracted from the response total of the
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questions pertaining to White American persons. Again, the calculation was performed
separately for each participant. Prejudice score was controlled for in all analyses.
4.3.3 Retrieval Task (A1) Low WMC persons were expected to make more recall errors (fewer
hits and more intrusions) than high WMC persons. More specifically, low compared to high
WMC persons were expected to demonstrate a greater number of stereotype-consistent intrusions
from previously studied lists and/or a lesser number of stereotype-inconsistent hits. To test this
prediction a mixed-model ANCOVA was run on the overall design: 2 Target-Race x 2 WordType x 2 WMC. Target-race (Black, Asian)7 and word-type (stereotype-consistent, inconsistent)8 served as the within-subject factors whereas WMC (high, low) was betweensubjects. Dependent variables of interest include accuracy calculated as a percent (accurate
recall/total possible) and an intrusion rate count. Black American and Asian American prejudice
levels were entered as control variables. See Tables 5 and 6 for overall recall accuracy/errors for
all persons and all word types. Regarding memory accuracy, results revealed a main effect of
word-type F(1, 73) = 8.80, ηp2 = .10, p < .01 as participants recalled more stereotype-consistent
descriptors (M = 46%) than stereotype-inconsistent descriptors (M = 40%). A main effect of
WMC emerged F(1, 73) = 6.45, ηp2 = .08, p = .01, wherein high, versus low, span persons
recalled more descriptors (high WMC: 46%; low WMC: 40%). Finally, there was a reliable
target-race x word-type interaction F(1, 73) = 62.00, ηp2 = .46, p < .01, as persons recalled more
stereotype-consistent, than –inconsistent, descriptors for the Black targets (stereotype-consistent:

7

Ambiguous Targets could not be included in this analyses as the descriptor words were either Black- or Asian(in)consistent and thus, could not be ambiguous consistent or inconsistent.
8
Neutral words were not included in the analysis as there were half as many neutral, compared to stereotypeconsistent or –inconsistent, words presented per list (2 versus 4), thus, the percentage of neutral words recalled is
artificially inflated.
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53%; stereotype-inconsistent: 30%) whereas the converse was true for Asian targets (stereotypeconsistent: 38%; stereotype-inconsistent: 50%).
It is worth noting that a word-type x WMC trend emerged F(1, 73) = 2.94, ηp2 = .04, p =
.09. This finding was decomposed by running separate ANCOVAs for each rule set comparing
error rate to only stereo-related lures for high versus low WMC persons. The results revealed that
high WMC persons recalled a significantly greater number of stereotype-consistent descriptors
(M = 51%) than low WMC persons (M = 41%), F(1, 73) = 9.81, ηp2 = .12, p < .01, whereas all
persons recalled a similar number of stereotype-inconsistent descriptors regardless of WMC,
F(1, 73) = .48, p = ns, (high WMC: 41%; low WMC: 39%).
Turning to memory errors or intrusions, a main effect of word-type F(1, 73) = 6.07, ηp2 =
.08, p = .02 was found, as persons committed a greater number of stereotype-consistent
intrusions (M = .38) than stereotype-inconsistent intrusions (M = .19). Additionally, the targetrace x word-type interaction produced significant results such that persons committed a similar
number of stereotype-consistent and –inconsistent intrusions for Black targets (stereotypeconsistent: .22; stereotype-inconsistent: .25) but committed significantly more stereotypeconsistent (M = .53) than –inconsistent intrusions (M = .12) for Asian targets.
Contrary to predictions, the main effect of WMC did not emerge. This null result was
likely due to the low number of intrusions overall. Only 55 (of 77) participants committed any
intrusions; 121 intrusions in total were recorded. When considering that there were a total of 462
lists recalled (77 participants, 6 lists each), this amounts to an average of .26 intrusion per list or
1.5 intrusions per person across all 6 lists.
Finally, my three a-priori predictions were tested. First, low WMC persons were expected
to make more stereotype-consistent than –inconsistent errors. This prediction was not supported
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as low WMC persons committed a similar number of stereotype-consistent (M = .80) and –
inconsistent (M = .46) intrusions, F(1, 32) = 1.70, p = ns. Next, low WMC persons were
expected to commit more stereotype-consistent than neutral intrusions. Results supported this
prediction as low WMC persons committed a greater number of stereotype-consistent (M = .80)
than neutral (M = .03) intrusions, F(1, 32) = 12.48, ηp2 = .28, p < .01. Finally, low, compared to
high, WMC persons were expected to commit more stereotype-consistent intrusions. Persons
committed an equal number of stereotype-consistent intrusions regardless of WMC (high WMC:
.74; low WMC: .80), thus, the final prediction was not supported F(1, 73) = .02, p = ns.
Overall, the results partially supported predictions as high WMC persons had an
advantage when it came to accurate recall. However, inconsistent with expectations low WMC
persons recalled fewer stereotype-consistent descriptors than high WMC; whereas they were
expected to recall fewer stereotype-inconsistent descriptors than their high WMC counterparts.
Potentially, high WMC persons were able to use the targets implied ethnicity to act as a category
label which aided in stereotype-consistent recall. Support for this suggestion comes from the fact
that high and low WMC persons recalled a similar number of descriptors when the target was
ambiguous (high WMC: 42%; low WMC: 37%), F(1, 73) = 3.09, p = ns. Importantly, this same
group of people did not commit a greater number of stereotype-consistent intrusions, or any type
intrusions for that matter. However, these findings failed to support the suggestion that low
WMC persons are more susceptible to making stereotypical intrusions on retrieval tasks than 1)
stereotype-inconsistent intrusions, or 2) high WMC persons.
4.3.4 Cued Recall Task (A2) First, considering cued recall accuracy (attributing the correct
target to a listed descriptor), a Target Race (Black, Asian) x 2 WMC (high, low) mixed-model
ANCOVA was run with WMC as a between-subjects variable. Black American and Asian
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American prejudice levels were entered as control variables. There were no significant effects or
interactions. Next, cued recall error was evaluated (attributing the incorrect target to a listed
descriptor). A mixed-model ANCOVA was run: 2 Error-Type x 2 Target Race x 2 WMC. Errortype (stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent) and Target Race (Black, Asian) served as the withinsubjects factor whereas WMC (high, low) was between-subjects. Only a main effect of errortype emerged as all persons committed a greater number of stereotype-consistent errors (M =
20%) than –inconsistent errors (M = 17%) regardless of WMC, F(1, 73) = 8.46, ηp2 = .10, p < .01
(See Tables 7 and 8 for overall accuracy and error rates). These results suggest that WMC has no
effect on performance for cued recall (source monitoring) tasks.
4.3.5 Familiarity Task (B) Low and high WMC persons were expected to perform equally well
netting a similar number of hits and false alarms. To test this prediction a mixed-model
ANCOVA was run on the overall design: 2 Target-Race x 3 Word-Type x 2 WMC. Target-race
(Black, Asian)9 and word-type (stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent, neutral) served as the
within-subject factors while WMC (high, low) was between-subjects. Dependent variables of
interest include hits and false alarms. Black American and Asian American prejudice levels were
entered as control variables. See Tables 9 and 10 for overall recall/errors for all persons and all
word types. No significant main effects or interactions emerged for hits. Only a main effect of
target-race was significant for false alarms F(1,62) = 6.01, ηp2 = .09, p = .02 as persons made
more false alarms to Black targets (5%) than Asian targets (2%). These results support the
predictions that: 1) low and high WMC persons would perform equally well netting similar hit
and false alarm rates, and 2) all persons would recognize all words (stereotype-consistent, inconsistent, and –neutral) with equal accuracy.
9

Ambiguous Targets could not be included in this analyses as the descriptor words were either Black- or Asian(in)consistent and thus, could not be ambiguous consistent or inconsistent.
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4.4 Discussion
The current findings provide some support for the suggestion that WMC affects the
influence of stereotypical information when performing retrieval tasks. The effect of WMC
during list intrusions was limited but this result was likely due to the extremely low intrusion
rate. A low intrusion rate for list recall is consistent with previous research (Kane & Engle, 2000;
which is not unusual for interference studies, see Melton & Irwin, 1940). However, WMC did
affect accurate list retrieval; but only stereotype-consistent retrieval such that high, versus low,
WMC persons recalled more of this type of descriptor whereas all persons recalled a similar
number of stereotype-inconsistent descriptors. Although this finding is different than the
predicted finding wherein low, compared to high, WMC persons were expected to recall fewer
stereotype-inconsistent descriptors; potentially, high WMC persons had the available capacity to
adopt the ethnic target names as akin to a category label, thus, providing a schema that aided in
schema-consistent recall.
The present findings do lend some support and extend the retrieval portion of Unsworth
and Engle’s (2007) maintenance and retrieval theory of individual differences in WMC as WMC
was found to influence performance on retrieval (i.e., accurate recall) but not familiarity tasks.
Previous researchers suggest that the differential in accurate list recall between high and low
WMC persons is due to one’s susceptibility to proactive interference (Kane and Engle, 2000).
Proactive interference (PI) occurs when retrieval of a current list (i.e., List 3) is impaired due to
the prior study of a similar list (i.e., List 2). Consistent with memory theories suggesting that the
avoidance of PI requires controlled processing (e.g., Anderson & Bjork, 1994), low WMC
persons were found to recall fewer and fewer accurate items as the list presentations progressed
(Kane and Engle, 2000). In an effort to replicate this finding, accurate recall was calculated
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separately for each of the four lists with ethnic targets.10 I was unable to demonstrate the effects
of PI as accurate recall did not decrease across lists generally (see Figure 4) or across lists for
any single word type (see Figures 5-7). Potentially, the effect did not emerge as the lists in the
current investigation were necessarily different than the lists used by Kane and Engle (2000) as
the current lists 1) contained a target name that could be utilized as a category label and 2)
included subcategories of words (stereotype-consistent, -inconsistent, and –neutral). Conversely,
Kane and Engle presented participants with multiple lists of animals, no category labels, and no
word subcategories. As differences in accurate recall emerged as a function of individual WMC
regardless of the lack of evidence supporting PI, the significance of the present finding is
twofold. First, I suggest that this result lends further support to supposition that it was in fact the
spontaneous encoding of the targets ethnicity that allowed for a superior performance of the high
versus the low WMC persons. Second, the current results may better be explained by other
models of individual differences in working memory capacity (see the General Discussion more
further explanation).

10

As accurate list recall was less for the ethnically ambiguous targets these lists were not included in the current
comparisons.
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CHAPTER 5:
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study represents one of the first attempts to establish connections between individual
WMC and stereotype use. The overall aim of the present investigation was to test whether
individual WMC impacted reliance on stereotypic information during maintenance and retrieval
tasks. Stereotypical associations are automatic and cognitively efficient, thus, without sufficient
resources to suppress, low relative to high WMC persons were expected to make more
stereotype-consistent errors. Conversely, all participants were expected to perform similarly on
inhibition and familiarity tasks as WMC has not been a factor in these types of tasks (Unsworth
& Engle, 2007). Results partially supported these predictions.
The results from the pilot study support the suggestion that all persons regardless of
individual WMC maintain similar knowledge of common social stereotypes related to African
American and Asian American men. Specifically, 50% or more of persons agreed that 91% of
the original person descriptors were common social stereotypes of African American (e.g.,
athletic, loud) and Asian American men (e.g., intelligent, short). This result allowed me to move
forward in testing my primary hypotheses with the confidence that high and low WMC persons
maintain similar knowledge of common racial stereotypes.
The goal of Experiment 1 was to assess the effect of WMC on stereotype use during
cognitive maintenance versus inhibition tasks. The results revealed that low WMC persons were
more susceptible to making stereotypical errors on maintenance tasks than 1) other errors (i.e.,
neutral or stereotype-inconsistent), or 2) high WMC persons; no performance differences were
observed between high and low capacity persons on inhibition tasks. It is important to note that
individual prejudice was controlled for during all analyses. This result is significant as it
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provides support for the maintenance portion of Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) maintenance and
retrieval theory of individual differences in WMC and extends extant literature to suggest that in
fact overreliance on stereotypic information may be affected by individual WMC putting low
WMC persons at greater risk of committing stereotype-consistent errors than their high WMC
counterparts. Clearly the suggestion is not that low WMC persons are likely to commit
stereotype-consistent errors during any decision-making task as performance was equivalent for
all persons during the inhibition task.
The modified go/no-go paradigm used in the present investigation is not the only
example of a maintenance task. A maintenance task is any task that requires active maintenance
of task relevant information in order to override fairly automatic responses. Based on the current
results, I suggest that low, compared to high WMC persons are more susceptible to making
stereotypical errors on any maintenance task. Furthermore, as ethnic stereotypes are only one
example of a stereotype, low WMC persons are likely vulnerable to the undue influence of other
stereotypes when performing maintenance tasks.
The goal of Experiment 2 was to assess the effect of WMC on stereotype use during
cognitive retrieval versus familiarity tasks. Overall, high WMC persons recalled a greater
number of person descriptors than low WMC persons. More specifically, they recalled a greater
number of stereotype-consistent person descriptors than low WMC persons; all persons recalled
a similar number of stereotype-inconsistent descriptors. I suggest that this finding was the result
of high WMC persons utilizing their additional capacity to process the target-name as a category
label which provided them with the advantage when recalling category-consistent words. It is
important to note that this advantage during accurate recall did not lead to a disadvantage during
inaccurate recall (i.e., intrusions) as all persons committed a similar number of intrusions.
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Moreover, this suggests that high WMC persons’ capacity was not compromised by their ability
to label and store the stereotyped information.
I originally expected that stereotypes would influence accurate descriptor recall as a
function of WMC such that low WMC persons would recall fewer stereotype-inconsistent than –
consistent words while descriptor stereotypicality was not expected to affect high WMC accurate
word recall. Instead, high WMC persons recalled more stereotype-consistent than –inconsistent
descriptors while low WMC persons recalled a similar number of descriptors regardless of
stereotype-consistency. Although different than expected, this result still supports two important
ideas. First, high, versus low, WMC provides an advantage with regard to accurate list recall.
Second, stereotypes do in fact differentially affect high and low WMC persons’ list recall.
The list presentation/recall paradigm used in the present investigation is not the only
example of a retrieval task. A retrieval task is any task that requires retrieving task-relevant
information in the presence of task-irrelevant information. Based on the current results, I suggest
that stereotypical information may benefit high, compared to low, WMC persons on any retrieval
task. Moreover, any task that makes use of a template or schema of sorts will benefit the high
WMC person, not just stereotypes but any semantic category where they can code and store the
information more efficiently than a low WMC person

5.1 Implications
5.1.1 Individual Differences in Stereotype Use
A myriad of factors have been put forth to explain individual differences and the
influence of stereotypes on behavior. For example, Christiansen, Kaplan, and Jones (1999) found
that individual differences in prejudice affected participants’ ratings of an ostensible application
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for a minority scholarship such that more prejudice persons rated the scholarship containing a
single negative stereotype more negatively than less prejudice persons. Glaser and Knowles
(2008) found that persons rating high in implicit negative attitude toward prejudice demonstrated
no correlation between the race/weapon stereotype (associating Black men and guns) and the
shooter bias (tendency to shoot armed Black men faster than armed White men). Additionally, an
implicit belief that oneself was prejudiced alone was not correlated with the race/weapon
stereotype-shooter bias relationship. However, persons believing themselves to be prejudiced and
rating low in implicit negative attitude toward prejudice (i.e., not thinking prejudice was bad)
achieved the greatest correlation between the race/weapon stereotype and shooter bias. Research
by Gushue and Carter (2000) revealed that heighted anxiety about race was linked to better
memory for stereotype-inconsistent information. As touched on here, most of the research
looking at the effect of individual differences on stereotype-use focuses on the influence of
various forms of prejudice. It is interesting to note that in the present investigation individual
WMC affected stereotype-use regardless of individual prejudice level. That is, even after
controlling for individual prejudice level in all Experiment 2 and 3 analyses, WMC still impacted
maintenance and retrieval task performance. This result suggests that WMC may be more
impactful in determining when stereotypes influence behavior than prejudice. That is, with
sufficient capacity high WMC persons were able to avoid making stereotype-consistent errors
during a maintenance task regardless of their individual prejudice level.
5.1.2 Executive Control and Stereotype Use
Given that a) stereotypes are ingrained associations that are automatically activated and
b) working memory is needed in order to override automatic response biases; it is surprising that
little research has been conducted examining the relationship between working memory and
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stereotype use (see Kleider, et al., 2012 for an exception). One such study conducted by Payne
(2005), found a link between engaged executive control and stereotype use. Although relevant to
the current work, what this study does not provide is a link between one’s static available
capacity and the influence of automatically activated stereotypes. One’s engaged control is not
synonymous with one’s available capacity. A low WMC person has the capacity to engage
executive control; it is under certain circumstances (maintenance and retrieval tasks) that their
capacity is overwhelmed and they succumb to automatic processing. Thus, the performance
differences observed by Payne (2005) may not be related to individual differences in WMC at
all. A second difference noted between the findings in the present study and those of the Payne
study is task-type. Payne observed performance differences in weapon identification, word
evaluation and person-judgment tasks as a function of engaged executive control. None of these
tasks could be classified as maintenance or retrieval tasks. Drawing on Unsworth and Engle’s
(2007) maintenance and retrieval theory of individual differences in WMC, I would suggest that
the differences found in Payne (2005) due to engaged executive control are distinct and not
necessarily related to individual available capacity (i.e., WMC).
5.1.3 Theory
The current work supports and extends Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) maintenance and
retrieval theory of individual differences in WMC by demonstrating a link between individual
WMC and stereotype use. However, there were some distinctions between predictions made by
the theory and the implications of the present results. Specifically, high WMC persons recalled
more list items in both the current study and the Kane and Engle (2000) study but the underlying
cognitive mechanism was different. In the current task, there was no evidence of proactive
interference; instead, I suggest that the nature of the list (describing an ostensible person)
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encouraged each list to be viewed as distinct preventing the buildup of proactive interference.
Potentially, each set of descriptors could be chunked to form a mental image of the described,
this image was likely quite distinct from ‘person’ to ‘person,’ thus, descriptors used in list 2 did
not seem relevant to list 3.
The lack of evidence for proactive interference does not explain the advantage that high
WMC persons demonstrated over low WMC persons when recalling stereotype-consistent
words. I suggest that this advantage was the result of the semantic or semantically related list
information which allowed high WMC people to activate a heuristic or template leading to
efficient storage. Low WMC people do not have the required capacity to spontaneously
categorize and store this information as efficiently. Thus, high WMC persons recalled
significantly more stereotype-consistent descriptors than low WMC persons. Conversely, the list
items in the Kane and Engle (2000) study included animals which are categories but not subcategories that tie to a heuristic or template or rule; and thus, did not present such an opportunity
for this sorting or subgrouping.
An alternative explanation for the retrieval results comes from the binding theory of
individual difference in WMC (Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007) wherein the assigned
function of WM is to establish and maintain ad hoc bindings between representations. Under this
framework high WMC persons are better able to temporarily bind stimuli with response than low
WMC persons. However, one would expect, if increased list recall was just a matter of superior
binding, then the stereotype-consistency of the words should not affect high WMC persons
retrieval performance. That is, high WMC persons should have had the advantage with both
stereotype-consistent and –inconsistent words if their increased list retrieval was simply a
function of stronger stimulus-response binding than low WMC persons. Potentially the suggested
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labeling/storage benefit afforded to high WMC persons is underpinned by categorization or
semantic storage.
There is much debate regarding how categorical knowledge is represented. Specifically,
prototype theories suggest that category membership is deteremined based on comparing
similarities of a new item to the average of one‘s exemplar experience whereas exemplar theory
argues that membership is instead deteremined by comparing to specific representations
encountered during personal training (Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970; Medin & Schaffer, 1978;
Smith & Minda, 2000). Applying this to the findings in the current study, potentially, high WMC
persons with their superior processing abilities, encoded target names extrapolating implied
ethnicity, which activated general knowledge regarding a representative ethnic member. A
prototype, as developed by cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1975), assumes the existance
of perceptual salience impacting degrees of category membership such that there are central and
marginal members. Prototypes are considered to be psychologically real (see Rosch, 1978). A
stereotype (Putnam, 1975) is seen as frame-and-script based information which provides the
context for a prototype representation. Simply put, the notion of stereotype is a sociocentric one
(see Silverstein, 2004, 2007). Regardless of the specific distinctions, it is important to note that
the two constructs are closely connected. Thus, prototype activation facilitates stereotype
activation and similarly stereotype activation facilitates prototype activation. Conversely, the link
between exemplars and stereotypes is much more tenuous. That is, activating an exemplar
category member who maintains various qualities, some stereotype-consistent some –
inconsistent, should promote equal retrieval of all descriptors. Thus, the present results may best
be explained by a prototype theory of categorization. Moreover, these findings suggest that
prototype versus exemplar categorization was the automatic default.

73
In summation, the present investigation extends extant literature regarding individual
differences that contribute to stereotype use. It is among the first to link individual working
memory capacity to stereotype use (See Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012). And, it lends some
support to while extending Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) maintenance and retrieval theory of
individual differences in WMC.
5.1.4 WMC, Stereotypes, and Memory Bias
The present retrieval result wherein high WMC persons accurately recalled more
stereotype-consistent list descriptors than low WMC persons may lead one to suspect that high
WMC persons are at an increased risk of biased decision making. However, the findings from
Kleider and colleagues (2012) suggest that this is not the case. As previously described, Kleider
and colleagues had high and low WMC persons act as mock-jurors and render verdict decisions
for Black and White defendants. It is reasonable to surmise that the participants in this study
attempted to retrieve case facts for review prior to rendering a verdict. Thus, the current results
would suggest that high WMC persons would likely retrieve more stereotype-consistent case
facts (e.g., the Black defendant was aggressive) which in turn, would bias their decisions.
However, actual results revealed that high WMC persons rendered similar verdict decisions
regardless of defendant race while low WMC persons assigned more guilty verdicts to Black
than White defendants in the cognitive load condition. From this, I suggest that high WMC
persons maintain more information generally, and more stereotype-consistent information
specifically, than low WMC persons; however, their ability to retain that information does not
bias their decisions. Instead high, compared to low, WMC persons are able to apply their
superior capacity to making more consistent judgments.
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5.3 Future Directions
Participants in the retrieval task generated surprisingly few list intrusions. Although this
result is common for this type of task, Kane and Engle (2000) suggested that fluency tasks
provide a rich opportunity for intrusions. Potentially, such a task could be used to test whether
individual WMC affects stereotypical intrusion rate. The expectation would be that low WMC
persons would generate significantly more list intrusions than high WMC persons. Testing this
prediction would be a worthwhile endeavor as the implications of such a result would be
significant. A tendency to recall any misinformation is of interest, however, a tendency to
disproportionately recall stereotype-consistent misinformation likely informs one’s propensity to
make biased decisions.
As previously mentioned, finding that high WMC persons recalled more stereotypeconsistent descriptors than either 1) stereotype-inconsistent descriptors or 2) low WMC persons
was unexpected. However, potentially was the result of high WMC persons spontaneously
encoding the target-name which they were able to use as akin to a category label facilitating later
category-consistent recall. This suggestion is easily tested by inquiring about persons’
memory/impression of the target after list recall. I would expect high, versus low, WMC persons
to have better memory of the ethnic target names and/or automatically encode an inferred
ethnicity. Additionally, the present results suggest that it was high WMC persons’ superior
capacity that allowed them to encode and extrapolate target information. However, if this
information was more readily available (i.e., automatically encoded), then it should promote the
automatic stereotype-consistent associations for low WMC persons too, allowing for similar
retrieval performance across groups. Specifically, this suggestion could be tested by presenting
an ethnically prototypical category member with each descriptor list. Under these conditions, I
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would expect high and low WMC persons to accurately retrieve a similar number of descriptors
and for all persons to retrieve more stereotype-consistent than –inconsistent descriptors.
As discussed above, the present investigation generated support for the prototype versus
exemplar theory of categorization. Future studies could investigate whether metacognition could
modify categorization techniques. Specifically, if category membership was made explicit via
the presentation of target demographics or photographs, in lieu of names and participants were
instructed to activate category exemplars in an effort to aid in retrieval, it would be interesting to
note whether persons’ stereotype-inconsistent retrieval increased. An increase in stereotypeinconsistent descriptor retrieval under these conditions would support a potential method for
decreasing bias. Potentially, WMC would differentially affect stereotype-descriptor retrieval
under these conditions, such that high WMC persons retrieve more descriptors overall with a
similar rate of stereotype-consistent and –inconsistent recall (supporting exemplar
categorization) whereas low WMC persons recall more stereotype-consistent than –inconsistent
descriptors (as encoding the target race has been made automatic). This result would suggest that
exemplar- versus prototype-based categorization requires increased capacity.
Finally, efforts should be made to extend the present findings as stereotypes are but one
example of a heuristic or mental shortcut that creates an automatic response bias. Other examples
of heuristics include the fluency heuristic which suggests that items made faster to process
through priming (semantic e.g., Whittlesea, 1993, or perceptual e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse,
1989), are more likely to be recognized as ‘old.’ The distinctiveness heuristic, when tested with
recognition memory often involves presenting participants with a list of words or a list of words
coupled with a picture for later recall. All participants recall true ‘old’ words with similar
accuracy but participants shown the word/picture list use the distinctive presentation to avoid
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false alarms to lure items (e.g., Dodson & Hege, 2005). According to Tversky & Kahneman’s
(1974) availability heuristic, people make decisions based on the ease with which something
comes to mind. For example, one may guess how common heart attacks are among middle aged
Americans by determining the percentage of their acquaintances that fit the description. Inferring
form the present investigation, it is reasonable to suggest that individual WMC may differentially
impact one’s reliance on such heuristics when under pressure. Specifically, low WMC persons
may be at increased risk of committing heuristic-consistent errors whereas high WMC persons
may be able to spontaneously adopt the heuristic as an aid to facilitate task performance.

5.4 Conclusion
The present research suggests that sufficient individual working memory capacity may be
a prerequisite to 1) avoiding the influence of automatically activated stereotypes on behavior
when performing maintenance-type tasks and, 2) spontaneously incorporating heuristicconsistent information into one’s cognitive toolbox to aid in performing retrieval-type tasks. This
suggestion is significant as stereotypes have been found to influence many behaviors including
categorization (Blair & Banaji, 1996, Experiment 2), memory (Stewart, Weeks, & Lupfer, 2003),
and decision making (Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby, 2002), however, to date, limited research has
identified WMC as a factor in this relationship (only Kleider, et al., 2012).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. List of person-descriptors presented to participants (Pilot Experiment) in
an effort to identify common racial stereotypes. Marks (‘x’ or ‘0’) under a
category indicate whether a descriptor was originally predicted to be Black
stereotype-consistent, Asian stereotype-consistent, or neither. The ‘x’ indicates
that the prediction was supported while the ‘0’ indicates that is was not.

Black
Aggressive
Amusing
Approachable
Assertive
Athletic
Attractive
Basketball
Player
Brainy
Brave
Bright
Calm
Caring
Comical
Compassionate
Con
Conscientious
Conventional
Convict
Courageous
Criminal
Crook
Culprit
Customary
Daring
Delinquent
Destructive
Diligent
Dim
Disciplined
Easygoing
Enduring
Felon
Fetching
Flashy
Football
Player
Forceful
Friendly
Funny
Good at Math
Good Looking
Gorgeous
Gutsy
Hardworking

Asian

Neutral

X
X
0
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
0
X
0
0
X
0
X
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
0
X
0
0
X
0
X
X
X
0
X
X
0
0
0
X
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Helpful
Hilarious
Hostile
Humble
Humorous
Industrious
Intelligent
Kind
Lazy
Linebacker
Little
Looker
Loud
Meek
Meticulous
Mild
Modest
Noisy
Offender
Old-Fashioned
Outgoing
Patient
Persistent
Petit
Point guard
Poor Student
Productive
Promiscuous
Quarterback
Quiet
Relaxed
Reserved
Rowdy
Running back
Self-Controlled
Sexual
Sharp
Short
Shy
Small in Stature
Smart
Sociable
Soft spoken
Stupid
Submissive
Thoughtful
Tolerant
Traditional
Understanding
Unintelligent
Unlawful
Unmotivated
Unproductive
Violent
Welcoming
Witty

0
X
X
X
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
0
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
0
0
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Table 2. Complete list of stereotype-consistent descriptors and participant agreement
ratings.

African American Consistent Descriptors
Descriptor
Aggressive
Amusing
Assertive
Athletic
Basketball Player
Comical
Con
Convict
Criminal
Crook
Culprit
Delinquent
Destructive
Felon
Flashy
Football Player
Forceful
Funny
Hilarious
Hostile
Humorous
Lazy
Linebacker
Loud
Noisy
Offender
Point guard
Poor Student
Promiscuous
Quarterback
Rowdy
Running back
Sexual
Stupid
Unintelligent
Unlawful
Unmotivated
Unproductive
Violent

African American

Asian

91%
57%
60%
97%
98%
69%
75%
88%
88%
84%
65%
73%
71%
88%
82%
98%
77%
69%
70%
70%
71%
83%
95%
91%
83%
77%
82%
78%
75%
92%
88%
92%
83%
68%
67%
78%
70%
71%
85%

3%
8%
22%
0%
1%
8%
1%
0%
0%
3%
5%
13%
10%
10%
2%
0%
7%
3%
4%
8%
5%
2%
1%
0%
2%
1%
1%
2%
3%
0%
1%
1%
0%
2%
2%
2%
3%
4%
2%
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Asian Consistent Descriptors
Descriptor

African American

Asian

Brainy
Bright
Calm
Customary
Diligent
Disciplined
Good at Math
Hardworking
Humble
Industrious
Intelligent
Little
Meek
Meticulous
Modest
Old-Fashioned
Patient
Petit
Productive
Quiet
Reserved
Sharp
Self-Controlled
Short
Shy
Small in Stature
Smart
Soft Spoken
Submissive
Traditional
Uncomplaining

3%
9%
3%
3%
8%
10%
3%
24%
14%
18%
17%
2%
6%
11%
8%
13%
5%
2%
14%
3%
2%
24%
8%
2%
3%
3%
5%
2%
12%
7%
3%

94%
79%
71%
63%
72%
83%
96%
65%
57%
56%
79%
92%
52%
52%
65%
61%
57%
84%
76%
87%
87%
56%
67%
92%
79%
93%
92%
80%
50%
81%
57%
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Table 3. Final set of descriptors used for memory test.

African American Consistent Descriptors
Descriptor
Aggressive
Amusing
Assertive
Athletic
Basketball Player
Comical
Convict
Criminal
Delinquent
Destructive
Flashy
Football Player
Forceful
Funny
Hilarious
Humorous
Lazy
Linebacker
Loud
Noisy
Promiscuous
Quarterback
Rowdy
Running back
Sexual
Unintelligent
Unlawful
Unmotivated
Unproductive
Violent

African American

Asian

91%
57%
60%
97%
98%
69%
88%
88%
73%
71%
82%
98%
77%
69%
70%
71%
83%
95%
91%
83%
75%
92%
88%
92%
83%
67%
78%
70%
71%
85%

3%
8%
22%
0%
1%
8%
0%
0%
13%
10%
2%
0%
7%
3%
4%
5%
2%
1%
0%
2%
3%
0%
1%
1%
0%
2%
2%
3%
4%
2%
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Asian Consistent Descriptors
Descriptor

African American

Asian

Brainy
Bright
Calm
Customary
Diligent
Disciplined
Good at Math
Hardworking
Humble
Industrious
Intelligent
Little
Meticulous
Mild
Modest
Old-Fashioned
Patient
Petit
Productive
Quiet
Reserved
Self-Controlled
Short
Shy
Small in Stature
Smart
Soft Spoken
Submissive
Traditional
Uncomplaining

3%
9%
3%
3%
8%
10%
3%
24%
14%
18%
17%
2%
11%
8%
8%
13%
5%
2%
14%
3%
2%
8%
2%
3%
3%
5%
2%
12%
7%
3%

94%
79%
71%
63%
72%
83%
96%
65%
57%
56%
79%
92%
52%
49%
65%
61%
57%
84%
76%
87%
87%
67%
92%
79%
93%
92%
80%
50%
81%
57%
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Table 4. Complete list of stereotype-neutral descriptors. Marks (‘x’ or ‘0’) under a category
indicate whether a descriptor was used in the memory test. The ‘x’ indicates that the descriptor
was used while the ‘0’ indicates that is was not.

Neutral
Bowls
Chews Gum
Dislikes Cereal
Dislikes Junk Mail
Drinks Coffee
Drinks Water
Drives Fast
Eats Bananas
Eats Meat
Enjoys Rain
From the City
Gardens
Grills Burgers
Has Close Friends
Has Pets
Has Short Nails
Has Vivid Dreams
Has a Brother
Hates Traffic
Is 28
Likes Blue
Likes Good Food
Likes Kids
Likes to Draw
Partial to Green
Plays Angry Birds
Rides a Bike
Surfs the Internet
Takes Hot Showers
Wants to Retire
Watches Movies
Watches TV
Watches the News
Wears Cologne
Wears Jeans

X
X
X
X
X
X
0
X
0
X
0
0
0
X
X
0
X
X
0
X
X
0
0
0
X
X
X
0
0
0
X
0
0
0
0

Distract
Target
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Figure 1. Illustration of the trial types in the conditional go/no-go task (Experiment 1A). For the
present example, the rule set was stereotype-consistent and required a go-response to Black
faces, weapons, and circles.
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Figure 2. Maintenance Task Performance: Errors made to stereotype-consistent versus
stereotype-neutral lures as a function of WMC.
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Figure 3. Maintenance Task Performance: Errors made to stereotype-inconsistent versus
stereotype-neutral lures as a function of WMC.

96
Table 5. Retrieval Task Performance: Accurate recall as a function of target race, word type, and
WMC.

Target Race

Word Type

Stereotype-Consistent
Black
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Consistent
Asian
Stereotype-Inconsistent

.

WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC

Accurate Recall %
49%
58%
29%
31%

33%
43%
50%
51%
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Table 6. Retrieval Task Performance: Inaccurate recall (i.e., intrusions) as a function of target
race, word type, and WMC.

Target Race

Word Type

Stereotype-Consistent
Black
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Consistent
Asian
Stereotype-Inconsistent

WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC

Intrusion Count
0.29
0.14
0.33
0.18

0.49
0.61
0.14
0.1
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Table 7. Source Monitoring Task Performance: Cued recall accuracy as a function of target race
and WMC.

Target
Race
Black

Asian

WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC

Recognition Hits%
28%
23%
28%
27%

99
Table 8. Source Monitoring Task Performance: Cued recall errors as a function of target race,
word type, and WMC.

Target Race

Word Type

Stereotype-Consistent
Black
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Consistent
Asian
Stereotype-Inconsistent

WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC

Recognition FAs %
19%
22%
16%
16%

19%
21%
18%
18%
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Table 9. Familiarity Task Performance: Accurate recognition (i.e., hits) as a function of target
race, word type, and WMC.

Target Race

Word Type

Stereotype-Consistent
Black
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Neutral

Stereotype-Consistent
Asian
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Neutral

WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC

Recognition Hits%
87%
86%
87%
89%
90%
92%

89%
94%
85%
81%
85%
97%
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Table 10. Familiarity Task Performance: Inaccurate recognition (i.e., false alarms) as a function
of target race, word type, and WMC.

Target Race

Word Type

Stereotype-Consistent
Black
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Neutral

Stereotype-Consistent
Asian
Stereotype-Inconsistent

Stereotype-Neutral

WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC
Low
WMC
High
WMC

Recognition FAs %
7%
2%
6%
0%
5%
8%

6%
3%
3%
0%
1%
0%
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Figure 4. Retrieval Task Performance: Accurate recall by list as a function of WMC.
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Figure 5. Retrieval Task Performance: Accurate recall by list for stereotype-consistent words as a
function of WMC.
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Figure 6. Retrieval Task Performance: Accurate recall by list for stereotype-inconsistent words
as a function of WMC.
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Figure 7. Retrieval Task Performance: Accurate recall by list for stereotype-neutral words as a
function of WMC.

